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Anticompetitive Corporate Spin-offs
Alexa Rosen Grealis a1
Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code allows corporations to
“spin-off” parent-controlled businesses tax-free. Traditionally an
important tool for divestitures and restructurings with U.S. tax
consequences, recent trends suggest section 355 is also of interest
to firms facing US antitrust consequences. Statements and
maneuvering by some such companies indicate firms are
considering spinning-off businesses to avert liability and ‘break
up’ on their own terms. Despite widespread renewed interest in
using antitrust laws to break up large corporations, the antitrust
implications of corporate spin-offs have thus far escaped
scholarly notice and scrutiny.
This Note posits that it is a mistake to treat corporate spin-offs as
the de facto corollary to government-supervised structural
separations. Tax-free spin-offs are not the self-mediated
equivalent to structural remedies for at least three reasons: (1)
section 355 allows dominant firms to engineer future market
conditions and concentrate power in ways government-supervised
separations simply do not; (2) parent companies may spin-off
fictitious competitors to artificially inflate competition and deflate
power in a given market; and (3) the parent-controlled process
invites parent firms to structure progeny firms in patently selfserving ways. The harm continues because the parent company
never redistributes monopoly power. Section 355’s authorization
of voluntary tax-free spin-offs without regard to anticompetitive
effect is in tension with antitrust policy. Yet, no legal mechanisms

a1
In loving memory of my dear friend, Maxwell B. Hartong. Utmost gratitude to John
Newman for encouraging me to write this piece and introducing me to modern antitrust
theory. Thanks to the University of Miami Business Law Review for insightful comments
and careful editing. All errors are my own.
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currently exist to stop or prevent firms from using spin-offs to
evade antitrust liability.
In response, this Note proposes a doctrinal shift in the way
antitrust courts and plaintiffs approach section 355 spin-offs,
beginning with the proper test for market power and
anticompetitive effect. As to prevention, regulators should adopt
strategies to understand, detect, and stop anticompetitive spinoffs. Legislation is needed to align section 355 with the goals for
competitive markets. Nonetheless, the path forward must
distinguish between anticompetitive spin-offs and competition on
the merits.
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“It is a question of proximity and degree.”
– OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 1

INTRODUCTION
Does a private restructuring accomplish the same end as a
government-supervised breakup? Consider Amazon, indisputably one of
the most powerful companies in the world. In light of its power, Amazon
has unsurprisingly caught the attention of antitrust enforcement agencies.
Amazon has come under increasing pressure from antitrust enforcement
agencies, specifically, regarding alleged anticompetitive practices in the
digital platforms and e-commerce markets. Interestingly, around the same
time, Amazon began positioning itself to spin-off a significant portion of
its business. Take Amazon’s 2016 Form 10-K: there, for the first time,
Amazon lists AWS (“Amazon Web Services”) as a separate entity.2
Listing a wholly owned subsidiary as a separate entity does not necessarily
mean a spin-off is on the horizon, but it is a relatively reliable signal among
publicly-owned parent companies planning to take a subsidiary public and
form a new stand-alone company. 3 And here, officially sequestering its
wholly owned subsidiary has the secondary purpose of laying the
foundation necessary for Amazon to later allege that the deal with itself
when it spun-off AWS occurred at nothing less than arms-length. Turning
back to the initial question, is Amazon’s deal actually at arms-length?
Does the spin-off serve the same antitrust goals as any other structural
break-up? The answer depends, on one hand, how one conceptualizes the
goals of antitrust, and on the other, how spin-offs affect competition.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
See Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Jan. 28, 2016).
3
See Cathy A. Birkeland et al., Spin-offs Unraveled, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE, (Oct. 31, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/31/spin-offsunraveled/ (explaining, “[t]he Form 10 is an opportunity to market SpinCo’s growth story”
in addition to meeting certain regulatory requirements). See also Jim Osman, IPO’s Are
Dead. New Companies Via Spinoff Offer Extreme Value in Bear Markets. Here Are 3
Worth Watching, FORBES, (Sept. 14, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimosman/2022/
09/14/ipos-are-dead-new-companies-via-spinoff-offer-extreme-value-here-are-3situations-to-watch/?sh=41c7c5047bd9.
1
2
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Antitrust has three basic goals: promoting reasonably unrestrained
trade, 4 preserving the competitive process, 5 and preventing business
combinations that substantially lessen competition.6 These goals come
from the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914—
the statutory sources of antitrust law in the United States. These Acts are
remarkably slim pieces of legislation for the complexity and range of
corporate activity they capture. Unsurprisingly, once Congress staked its
perimeter, it was for the courts to figure out how to connect the posts and, 7
at times, mend fences with distressed markets and faceless corporate
entities. 8 Antitrust law is unique in this characteristic: Modern doctrine
evolved from a creature of statute into the “common law of
competition[.]” 9 Adversarial proceedings before federal courts are the
primary vehicle for formulating the substantive standards of the law and
the dominant antitrust institution is the public enforcement body and. 10
One of the defining turns in antitrust history was the emergence of the
Chicago School of Antitrust. 11 The Chicago School emphasized economic
analysis in antitrust jurisprudence, which sharpened antitrust’s doctrinal
focus in several key ways. 12 For one, new understanding about allocative
and productive efficiency shaped the way Chicago School advocates, such
as Richard Posner and Robert Bork, and eventually courts thought about
concentration (market power) and the behavior of competitive markets. 13
Two, the Chicago School took the position that the common law of
antitrust should first and foremost maximize “consumer welfare.” 14 In the
words of then-Professor Bork, “competition” is “a shorthand expression

See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
See id. at § 2.
6
See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1914).
7
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 269-70.
8
See George Bittlingmayer, Antitrust and Business Activity: The First Quarter
Century, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 363, 388 (1996) (discussing Congress’s reaction to the
Supreme Court’s rule of reason in passing the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914).
9
Peritz, supra note 7, at 270.
10
ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 20, 81 (4th ed. 2022).
11
See id. at 85-86.
12
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 283
(1985).
13
See GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 10, at 85-86. As Gavil and colleagues explain, the
Chicago School “sought to apply the insights of price theory to antitrust law.”
14
See id. at 86. The Chicago School infused distinctly laissez-faire principles into
modern antitrust theory, positing, consumer welfare is maximized when firms are left to
seek profits and markets are unfettered by regulation. See id. at 93-98.
4
5
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for consumer welfare.” 15 Maximizing consumer welfare meant rekeying
the legal analysis to consumer interests—lower prices, higher output, and
greater access to innovations—and abandoning the interests of individual
competitors. 16 A necessary premise of the consumer welfare principle was
that, in a competitive market, a firm could not forsake consumer interests
without forgoing firm profits so most harms would be self-correcting. 17 It
followed that consumers are a better ‘check’ on competition because they
naturally eschew the species of control competition law proscribes. 18
To the extent that the Chicago School started a movement, the effect
of that movement was largely away from government intervention and
toward self-regulation and “reform.” 19 The Supreme Court adopted the
Chicago School’s consumer welfare standard in 1979. 20 Chicago School
reform reached its peak with the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. 21 Trinko is
largely recognized as taking the wind out of antitrust courts’ sails. 22 Even
if Trinko’s actual holding was fairly narrow, Justice Scalia’s defendantfriendly tone and dicta encouraged lower courts to cabin the refusal-todeal doctrine. 23 In fact, Microsoft, 24 LePage’s, 25 Dentsply, 26 and
Viamedia 27 stand alone as some of the few victories of Section 2 plaintiffs
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 61
(1978).
16
See GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 10, at 93-98.
17
See id. at 86.
18
See id.
19
In 1968, Robert H. Bork (then a professor at Yale Law School) wrote, “[i]f I am
correct, reform is needed, but it need not come from Congress. Antitrust policy is
determined . . . by the Supreme Court.” Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 242, 242 (1967). For an alternative view, see, for example, William E.
Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History, 87 UNIV.
CHI. L. R. 459 (2020).
20
See Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 300, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 66)).
21
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
22
See Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH
L. REV. 741, 754 (2006), lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&con
text=facpubs.
23
See Frank X. Schoen, Exclusionary Conduct After Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1625,
1638 (2005), for an in-depth analysis of the chilling effect of Trinko on Section 2 litigation.
See also Zephyr Teachout, Neil Gorsuch Sides with Big Business, Big Donors and Big
Bosses, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2017/02/21/neil-gorsuch-always-sides-with-big-business-big-donorsand-big-bosses/.
24
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 253 F. 3d 34, 64-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
25
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162-64 (3d Cir. 2003).
26
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
27
Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 463 (7th Cir. 2020).
15
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in the twenty-first century. Many more failed. The main take-away is, in
the fifty or so years following the Chicago School movement, antitrust
became more technical and courts became less willing to entertain antitrust
claims. 28
It is worth pausing here to remark on the renewed interest in
prosecuting antitrust claims among enforcement agencies in recent
years. 29 In recent years, enforcement agencies have filed many more
antitrust suits than they did in the late twentieth century. 30 Along with a
renewed interest in enforcement, antitrust agencies have expressed an
interest in reviving structural remedies. 31 Structural remedies are generally
seen as more drastic by judges and corporations alike, although the reasons
differ. For corporations, court-sanctioned structural remedies matter
because they entail changes in control and significant drops in shareholder
value. 32 For this and other reasons, directors and shareholders have paid
close attention to the potential for structural remedies, in some instances

Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 583, 585 (2019).
29
Other political actors, including President Biden, have expressed renewed interest in
addressing antitrust concerns too. See Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July
9, 2021). During the 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns, candidates have called for
stronger antitrust enforcement. William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, A Policy at
Peace with Itself: Antitrust Remedies for Our Concentrated, Uncompetitive Economy,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-policy-at-peace-with-its
elf-antitrust-remedies-for-our-concentrated-uncompetitive-economy/; Jennifer
Huddleston, Tech Policy and the 2020 Election, Part 3: Antitrust and Big Tech, AM.
ACTION F. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tech-policy-and
-the-2020-election-part-3-antitrust-and-big-tech/.
30
THURMAN ARNOLD PROJECT, Modern U.S. Antitrust Theory and Evidence amid Rising
Concerns of Market Power and Its Effects, YALE SCH. OF MGMT: MOD. ANTITRUST ENF’T,
https://som.yale.edu/centers/thurman-arnold-project-at-yale/antitrust-enforcement-data
(June 22, 2020). For additional insight, consult Litigation Analytics on WestLaw, case
type, “Antitrust.”
31
See generally SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE: MAJORITY
STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519. See also Howard A.
Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2001) for an explanation of remedial strategies in antitrust. Behavioral remedies
bar a defendant firm from engaging in particular actions that a court has deemed
anticompetitive but stop short of redistributing competitive assets in the relevant markets,
whereas structural remedies are generally accomplished by breaking a firm into two or
more competitive entities, or requiring the sale of some right, input, or facility to extant
competitors (i.e., divestiture). Id.
32
See infra Part I, Subsection 3.
28
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even suggesting that the corporation spin-off subsidiary businesses to
avoid antitrust liability. 33
Much of what this Note calls into question is whether and under what
conditions the privileges under section 355 of the tax code run up against
the boundaries of the Sherman Act and frustrate the common law of
competition. 34 Part I of this Note examines section 355 of the corporate
tax code and its history of being used for voluntary corporate restructuring
as well as a mechanism to unlock shareholder value. After reviewing the
history and basic mechanics of a section 355 spin-off, this Note turns to
the potentially anticompetitive nature of spin-off transactions in Part II.
The bulk of the analysis unfolds in Parts II and III. Part II examines
how and under what circumstances completely valid spin-off transactions
may be used for anticompetitive ends and Part III analyzes the doctrinal
implications of anticompetitive spin-offs. Here, two anchors of modern
antitrust theory – power analyses and liability targets – are examined, and
the existing theoretical frameworks are adapted to better capture the
market effects of section 355 spin-offs. Part III responds to the anticipated
objection: Is not some separation better than no separation? In short,
separation in form only fails to redistribute control in a meaningful way
and risks placing the offending firm outside the reach of judicial remedies.
Having demonstrated several scenarios in which section 355 may be
used to subvert market competition and then proposed a method for tracing
control and liability, Part IV offers two strategies that lawmakers and
antitrust enforcers should adopt to ensure the alignment of self-initiated
structural remedies with antitrust goals. Part IV reiterates the delicacy of
the current moment: though voluntary corporate ‘break ups’ should be
encouraged, blind acceptance of spin-offs as the proper mechanism risks
entrenching monopolies and leaving competitive harms unremedied. To
leave room for differences in degree, the proposed strategies rely on factspecific inquiries, and encourage regulators, lawmakers, courts, and
market stakeholders to be alert to tax-free restructurings, particularly when
undertaken by companies that are facing antitrust liability.
33
See, e.g., Annie Palmer, Former Amazon Vice President Calls for the Company to
Split Its Retail and Cloud Businesses, CNBC: TECH (July 24, 2020, 1:04 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/24/former-amazon-senior-engineer-calls-for-aws-spinoff.
html (documenting comments by former Amazon executive suggesting “Amazon might
choose to proactively split off AWS from the company as an effort to get ahead of looming
antitrust scrutiny.”); Will Healy, Why Antitrust Actions Against Alphabet May Be Good
For Investors, THE MOTLEY FOOL (June 26, 2021, 6:12 AM), https://www.fool.com/
investing/2021/06/26/why-antitrust-actions-against-alphabet-may-be-good/ (“[A spin-off]
could bring about the ‘breakup’ antitrust regulators seek, but on terms decided by
Alphabet.”).
34
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.

2022]

ANTICOMPETITIVE CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS

I.

203

SELF-INITIATED BREAKUPS VIS-À-VIS SPIN-OFF
TRANSACTIONS

Corporations voluntarily restructure for any number of legitimate
business reasons, which certainly include an effort to avoid a variety of
undesired outcomes, like the loss of value associated with overdiversification. 35 And amidst the looming threat of a return to structural
remedies, another reason corporations may voluntarily restructure –
specifically, those facing antitrust scrutiny – is to beat the government to
it. That is, corporations may elect to restructure themselves by divesting
one or more corporate assets before the government can come in and do it
for them. Commentators have thus far ignored the possibility that
voluntary restructuring in response to antitrust scrutiny is only part of the
picture. Another explanation is that breaking up on one’s own terms avoids
the loss of control that inheres in structural antitrust remedies.
A corporation may voluntarily divest assets either by sell-off or by
spin-off. 36 As the name suggests, a sell-off involves a corporation giving
up ownership and control of an asset in exchange for cash or a cash
equivalent. 37 A spin-off involves breaking off an asset and forming an
independent entity, but ownership remains with the shareholders of the
original firm vis-à-vis a stock distribution. 38 Spin-off transactions,
codified under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, come with the
added benefit of being tax-neutral. 39 In other words, no gain or loss is
realized at the corporate or shareholder level with the distribution of stock
in the newly independent entity. 40 While spin-offs have always been
popular because of their tax-free benefit and high returns, lately,
corporations and their shareholders are looking to spin-offs as a way to
minimize liability of monopolization, while still maximizing control.41
This Part will explore section 355 spin-off transactions through the
lens of corporations facing antitrust liability, and in particular, how those
corporations may use section 355 to divest themselves of powerful
35
See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 993-94
(Saul Levmore et al. eds., 9th ed. 2021)
36
A. Qayyum Khan & Dileep R. Mehta, Voluntary Divestitures and the Choice Between
Sell-Offs and Spin-Offs, 31 FIN. REV. 885, 885-86 (Nov. 1996).
37
Id. at 885.
38
Id. at 885-86.
39
I.R.C. § 355.
40
Id.
41
E.g.., Tom Foremski, Antitrust Probes, Spinoffs, and Missing Financials: Is a Preemptive Breakup Ahead for Google?, ZD NET (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/
article/antitrust-probes-and-spinoffs-reasons-for-googs-missing-financial-numbers/
(“Wall Street is rife with reports that Google (Google’s parent company is Alphabet Inc.,)
is considering selling part of its ad business to appease antitrust regulators and politicians
in the US and Europe.”).
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subsidiaries in order to avoid antitrust liability. The first Section begins
with an overview of a spin-off transaction: a brief history of spin-off
transactions in the United States, the structure and planning of a typical
spin-off, and the statutory and common-law requirements of a tax-free
distribution. Then, the next Section will discuss the strategic advantages
of spin-off transactions and general separation issues noted by law firms
that advise clients in corporate spin-offs.

A.

Section 355 Spin-off Transactions

A spin-off usually involves the separation of a company’s businesses
through the creation of one or more publicly traded companies. 42 At a basic
level, a section 355 transaction starts with a parent company owned by
shareholders and a subsidiary owned by the parent. 43 The transaction
generally results in the shareholders of the parent owning stock in two
separate entities. 44 For intuitive convenience, this Note proceeds by
referring to the company responsible for distributing stock of the
subsidiary as “ParentCo,” and the newly formed independent company as
“SpinCo,” that is, the spun-off subsidiary. 45 Technically, there are two
other types of section 355 spin-off transactions, i.e., “split-offs” and “splitups.” 46 Appendix I provides a diagram illustrating each type. This paper
deals mainly with the classic spin-off transaction: shareholders of
ParentCo retain stock in ParentCo and receive stock in SpinCo, thus
continuing beneficial ownership in ParentCo and obtaining beneficial
ownership in SpinCo. Upon completion, ParentCo shareholders control
two newly separate corporate entities.

1. Historical Overview and Requirements
Tax-free corporate separations have been in U.S. tax law since 1918. 47
As they are known today, however, spin-off transactions were codified in
1954 under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code. 48 The 1954 version
See generally BRATTON, supra note 35, at 995.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Elsewhere in the literature, the parent and distributing corporation are also referred to
as “Distributing” and the subsidiary corporation is generally referred to as “Controlled.”
See Krishna Veeraraghavan & Bradley S. King, Considerations in Carve-out Transactions,
23 M&A LAW. at 1, 8 (2019).
46
See App. I for an illustration of the three types of primary spin-off transactions. See
also Robert A. Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Off, 1967 DUKE L. J. 1, 2-3 (1967); see
generally Thomas M. Ward, Spin-Off Spins in Two Directions, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
389 (1968).
47
Revenue Act of 1918, Ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
48
See Jacobs, supra note 46, at 1.
42
43
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of the Code continues to provide the basic statutory framework for modern
tax-free spin-off transactions. 49 And since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a
section 355 spin-off is “the only way a company can distribute appreciated
property to its shareholders without incurring a corporate-level tax.” 50
There are four basic statutory requirements of a spin-off transaction:
(1) control, (2) non-device, (3) active trade or business, and (4)
distribution. 51 Generally, evidence of a device 52 or unrebutted evidence of
a plan 53 is enough to disqualify a transaction from favorable tax treatment
even though all other affirmative requirements of section 355 are met. 54
As is often the case, common-law courts have added additional
requirements in the process of interpreting the statutory law. Courts
require (a) a business purpose, (b) continuity of interest, and (c) continuity
of business enterprise, before finding tax-free treatment warranted. 55
Though a detailed description of the tests courts apply when evaluating the
merits of a spin-off is beyond the scope of this article, two tests – the

See I.R.C. § 355.
Edward J. Schnee et al., Corporate Spin-offs: A Well-Planned Prescription for Ailing
Companies, J. ACCT. 47, 47 (1998).
51
See I.R.C. § 355 (a)(1).
52
“Device” factors include pro rata distributions, post-distribution sales of ParentCo or
SpinCo stock and the existence of substantial non-business assets in ParentCo or SpinCo.
“Non-device” factors include (i) a strong business purpose; (ii) a publicly traded and widely
held ParentCo; and (iii) corporate shareholders of ParentCo who are entitled to a 100
percent dividends-received deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2 (d)(2)-(3).
53
“A key factor that tends to show a possible device is a plan or intent at the time of the
spin-off to sell ParentCo or SpinCo in a taxable disposition after the spin-off.” Birkeland
et al., supra note 3. A plan is presumed when a third party acquires fifty percent or more
of either ParentCo or SpinCo within the two years before or the two years after a separation.
Id. Like evidence of a device, evidence of a plan disqualifies the distribution from tax-free
treatment, “though only at the corporate level”. Id.
54
See generally I.R.C. § 355 (d) & (e); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-2(d) & 1.355-7(b).
55
See, e.g., Comm’r v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding “that
even if there is no tax avoidance motive, a reorganization having no business reason does
not result in the tax advantages which section 355 confers upon those who satisfy the legal
requirements for its benefits”); Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir.
1981) (discussing “the general nonstatutory ‘continuity of business enterprise’
requirement”) (quoting Reef Corp. v. Comm’r, 368 F.2d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1966)).
49
50
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Corporate Business Purpose Test 56 and the Distribution of Control Test 57
– are relevant to the central thesis of this Note.
Notwithstanding disqualification under section 355, a spin-off (1)
sought for an improper purpose or (2) orchestrated in breach of a duty
either side owes its respective corporation may open the boards of
directors to post-spin liability. 58 Post-spin liability typically arises from a
claim of breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance, or unlawful
dividend. 59 For example, if a spin-off is not disqualified as a plan or device
before the separation is complete, a plaintiff may object to the transaction
under a fraudulent conveyance theory, post-spin. 60 While courts are privy
to the abuses of corporate control made possible by section 355, 61 to date,
no court has evaluated a claim that a corporation abused section 355 as a
means to avoid antitrust liability.

2. Timeline and Internal Processes 62
Successful spin-off transactions require considerable time, planning,
and capital. Attorneys specializing in spin-offs generally find that a
56
The Corporate Business Purpose looks at whether the spin-off is sufficiently
“motivated by a corporate level business purpose (other than the saving of federal taxes)
that cannot be efficiently achieved through any other nontaxable transaction. Note that
shareholder-level business purposes (e.g., to increase shareholder value) are not sufficient
(though they may provide a basis for demonstrating a valid corporate business purpose).”
Birkeland et al., supra note 3. Acceptable business purposes include “facilitate[ing] access
to capital (for either ParentCo or SpinCo)” and “enhance[ing] ‘fit and focus’ of the
ParentCo and SpinCo businesses.” Id. .
57
The Distribution of Control test is a basis corporate finance test of whether ParentCo
distributed “at least an 80% interest in SpinCo to ParentCo shareholders.” Id. (emphasis
added).
58
See In re Tronox Inc., 429 B.R. 73, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
59
See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 934,
941, 943, 944, 945 (D. Tex. 2011) (declining to dismiss complaint where plaintiff pled
particular facts tending to establish defendant ParentCo “intended to hinder, delay, or
defraud [SpinCo’s] creditors”; director of SpinCo “stood on both sides of the spin-off
transaction” in breach of his fiduciary duty to SpinCo; ParentCo aided and abetted SpinCo
director’s breach of fiduciary duty; and the transaction’s structure as a spin-off brought
ParentCo’s distribution of stock in excess of SpinCo’s value under the “more expansive
view of what constitutes a “dividend” under Delaware’s unlawful- dividend statute”). See
also In re Tronox, Inc., 503 B.R. 239, 276, 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2013) (holding the parentdefendant corporation could not hide behind the protection of a spin-off transaction where
it unilaterally orchestrated a series of deals “to free substantially all of [its] assets . . . from
85 years of environmental and tort liabilities.”).
60
See In re Tronox, Inc., 503 B.R. at 276.
61
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d at 937-39; Tatum v. RJR Pension
Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 361 (4th Cir. 2014); Gada v. United States., 460 F. Supp. 859,
870-71 (D. Conn. 1978); Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 225 B.R. 846, 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1998).
62
See Spin-off Timeline infra App. II.
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traditional spin-off takes six to eight months from start to finish. 63
Likewise, practitioners in the area report directors and managers of
ParentCo decide nearly (if not) all aspects of the transaction—beginning
with the basic decision as to which business(es) will be spun-off, including
who will direct and manage SpinCo, and what, if any, services either entity
will provide to the other post-spin. 64 In Delaware and most other states,
the decision to spin-off a subsidiary rests with the board and the board
alone; no shareholder approval is needed. 65 This feature is different from
other types of voluntary exchanges of property and sales, where
shareholder approval is required. 66
Up until the moment of complete separation of SpinCo from ParentCo,
the directors of the parent board may, rather must, make 100% of the
decisions related to SpinCo’s business. 67 And because SpinCo typically
begins as a wholly owned subsidiary of ParentCo, its corporate structure,
charter, and bylaws are established by the parent without holding a vote of
non-director shareholders. 68
In general, Delaware courts limit parent directors’ fiduciary duties to
ParentCo, exclusively; no duties are owed to SpinCo at any point on the
transaction timeline.69 Thus, as a fiduciary matter, the directors of
ParentCo are free to consider the interests of ParentCo, exclusively, in
establishing the terms of the spin-off and separation arrangements. 70 But
See Francis J. Aquila, Key Issues When Considering a Spin-off, PRAC. L. J., 20, 26.
As the author notes, however, “[t]he timeline and process for a spin-off can vary
substantially from one transaction to another, depending on the level of integration between
the parent company and the subsidiary and whether the spin-off will be coupled with
another transaction, as is often the case.” Id.
64
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, SPIN-OFF GUIDE 11 (2021). The parent board
generally (i) determines “the scope of the business SpinCo will conduct,” (ii) allocates
assets and liabilities between itself and SpinCo, (iii) determines the initial capital structure
of SpinCo, and (iv) establishes SpinCo’s governance structure and board composition. See
also Birkland et. al., supra note 3.
65
The logic is, because a spin-off is technically a distribution of a dividend, and the
board of directors has the sole power to declare and pay dividends, no shareholder approval
is required. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 170, 173 (2022).
66
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 271(a) (2022); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c)
(requiring board of directors to submit merger plan to stockholders for the purpose of acting
in agreement).
67
This conclusion originates in basic principles of corporate governance, see DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 271(a) (2022).
68
See generally WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64.
69
See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Del.
1988) (concluding that “prior to the date of distribution the interests held by Anadarko’s
prospective stockholders were insufficient to impose fiduciary obligations on the parent
and the subsidiary’s directors.”).
70
See id.; see also VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 635 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“There is only one substantive interest to be protected [that of the parent], and hence ‘no
63
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once ParentCo’s shareholders receive SpinCo shares, a director of
ParentCo may be in breach of his or her fiduciary duty to ParentCo
shareholders if SpinCo was designed to fail or to be severely
undercapitalized. 71 As a consequence, if a spin-off transaction were to be
found in violation of state or federal antitrust laws, the directors of the
parent company could face additionally liability under Title 15, Section
24, of the United States Code. 72 As mentioned above, this issue has yet to
come before a state or federal court.
With the freedom and ample protection provided by the business
judgment rule, the ParentCo board begins the first phase of organizing a
spin-off. 73 At the start of Phase I, ParentCo must define the scope of the
business SpinCo will conduct. 74 Here, ParentCo has two main goals. The
first is financial: ParentCo will want to shape SpinCo so to add value above
and beyond that of the stock ParentCo’s shareholders otherwise hold. 75
The second is substantive: ParentCo will want to ensure the nature of the
business being spun-off, relative to the nature of the business retained,
comports with ParentCo’s underlying rationale for conducting the spin. 76
ParentCo may consider (1) pre-existing relationships between itself,
SpinCo, and third parties; (2) terms in existing contracts with its creditors
and those of the subsidiary; and (3) the effect of the spin on its own and
SpinCo’s product markets. 77
Assuming the ParentCo board provides initial approval, Phase II
begins. Substantially all of the drafting takes place during the second
phase—drafting of separation agreements, regulatory forms, financial
agreements, as well SpinCo’s constitutive documents.78 ParentCo will
divided loyalty’ of the subsidiary’s directors and no need for special scrutiny of their
actions.”) (quoting Bresnick v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 77 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1950)).
71
U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941-45 (D.
Tex. 2011).
72
See, e.g., FTC v. Shkreli, 581 F. Supp. 3d 579, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (although, it
is somewhat rare for individual directors to be prosecuted for the anticompetitive conduct
of the corporations they direct); see also United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411-14
(1962) (discussing Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, sec. 14, 38 Stat. 730, 736 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 24); 15 U.S.C. § 24 (“Whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal
provisions of the antitrust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the
individual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who shall have authorized,
ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violation . . . .”).
73
See timeline infra App. II.
74
See Birkland et al., supra note 3.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. Form 10 will also be filed with the SEC during phase two. See WACHTELL, LIPTON,
ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64 at 43.
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select the jurisdiction of incorporation of the spin-off company and
determine the size and composition of its board of directors, including any
board committees. 79 In determining board composition, ParentCo may
decide to move members of the parent’s board to (or place concurrently
on) the board of the spin-off company. 80 Phase II concludes with
responding to and clearing all SEC comments to ParentCo’s Form 10
filing. 81
Once the SEC declares ParentCo’s Form 10 effective, the third and
final phase begins. The focus of Phase III is disseminating information and
distributing stock. 82 At the end of Phase III, SpinCo is no longer a
subsidiary of ParentCo.

3. Advantages and General Separation Issues
Beyond the benefit of tax-free treatment at both the corporate and
shareholder level, spin-off transactions offer additional advantages.
Perhaps the most significant advantage is the value created by spin-off
transactions compared to other forms of reorganization and divestiture. 83
A growing body of empirical research corroborates the assertion that spinoff divestitures create statistically significant and economically material
value for all parties to the transaction. 84
In the 1970s, economists began investigating the relationship between
voluntary divestiture of business assets and value creation.85 In a crude
sense, a spin-off is a merger in reverse, without tax. Instead of combining
independent businesses into one, the basic goal of a spin-off is to separate
businesses. So, if the movement of assets alone was the driving force of
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64 at 22.
Although, overlap between the parent and the spin-off company generally is limited
to a minority of each board to preserve the tax-free nature of the spin-off. For a brief
discussion of director overboarding in context, see Gregory E. Ostling & David K. Lam,
SpinOffs: The Decision to Separate and Considerations for the Board, 2014 PRAC. L. J. 42,
51-52. But see U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 817 F.Supp. 2d 937, 94145 (D. Tex. 2011) (discussing a caveat to the generalizations Ostling and Lam discuss,
namely, a cognizable claim for breach of fiduciary duty may be stated when a director of
ParentCo also serves as the sole director of SpinCo, and SpinCo becomes severely
distressed under the concurrent directorship).
81
See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64 at 42-43, Annex A at A-7.
82
See id. Annex A at A-7—A-9.
83
See BRATTON, supra note 35, at 994-96.
84
James E. Owers & Bruno S. Sergi, The Ongoing Contributions of Spin-Off Research
and Practice to Understanding Corporate Restructuring and Wealth Creation: $100
Billion In 1 Decade, 8 NATURE: HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. COMMC’NS 7 (2021). These
advantages come in addition to several governance-related advantages. See also Birkeland
et al., supra note 3.
85
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Divestiture and Share Price, 10 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 619, 623 (1975).
79
80
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value, one might have thought that a voluntary divestiture would produce
the opposite effect of what the economists and corporate lawyers observed
during historical merger booms. 86 That is, voluntary divestiture would
result in a decrease in company value, as reflected by stock prices.
But what researchers found was just the opposite. In 1975, Kenneth J.
Boudreaux published an article in The Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, which found “announcements of voluntary
divestitures are associated with unusually positive price movements in the
securities of the divesting firms near the announcement date” based on a
study of 138 voluntary and 31 involuntary corporate divestitures between
1965 and 1970. 87 Professor Boudreaux concluded that the market reacted
to voluntary divestitures much like voluntary asset acquisition or merger. 88
Importantly, however, Professor Boudreaux’s analysis revealed the
opposite effect of involuntary divestitures. 89 Attributable in part to the
various unique events associated with an involuntary divestiture – e.g.,
filing an antitrust complaint and rendering a company-adverse judgment –
involuntary divestiture announcements were associated with unusually
negative price movements. 90
Eight years later, Gailen L. Hite and James E. Owers replicated
Professor Boudreaux’s findings, this time comparing court ordered
involuntary divestitures with voluntary divestitures of a more narrowly
defined sample, 123 voluntary spin-offs between 1963 and 1981. 91 Here
again, the researchers found that involuntary divestitures were associated
with negative returns, but voluntary spin-offs were associated with a
positive return of 7.0% of the original equity from fifty days prior to the
announcement through completion of the spin-off. 92 More recently,
See RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895-1956 3335 (1959).
87
See generally Boudreaux, supra note 85.
88
Id. at 621.
89
Id. at 624-25. Involuntary divestitures were the result of a proceeding to force
divestiture, usually brought by the FTC under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id.
90
Id. at 623 (“The general expectation that the market would react unfavorably to news
of forced divestitures seems to be ratified by the data.”).
91
See Gailen L. Hite & James E. Owers, Security Price Reactions Around Corporate
Spin-Off Announcements, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (1983).
92
Id.; see also Robert Parrino. Spinoffs and Wealth Transfers: The Marriott Case, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 24 (1997) (finding Marriott substantially increased shareholder wealth
following a spin-off distribution representing almost eighty percent of the value of its
equity). It is worth noting, however, the Marriott spin-off precipitated considerable losses
to bondholders. Id. at 263. As Professor Parrino explains, stock price alone may fail to
paint an accurate picture of firm value when a spin-off results in significant transaction
costs and inefficiencies. Id. at 266-68. Efforts by Marriott’s bondholders to block the spinoff sapped much value from the transaction, notwithstanding the fact that the indentures
contained “no provisions that would prohibit the [spin-off].” Id. at 253.
86
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researchers further refined the question of how much value could be
garnered vis-à-vis voluntary divestiture. For example, one study found the
announcement effects of both voluntary spin-offs and voluntary sell-offs
are significantly positive, but those of spin-offs are significantly larger. 93
The same study, however, noted sell-offs seem to have more robust longterm effects. 94 In a retrospective study published in June 2021, Professors
Owers and Sergi reported, in the ten years between 2007 and 2017, 249
voluntary spin-offs created almost $100 billion in monetary incremental
value to shareholders. 95
Despite the significant monetary advantages that generally accompany
spin-offs, the transactions are not impervious to pitfalls. For one, they can
be vehicles for serious mismanagement. 96 In one fell swoop, directors have
used spin-offs to shuttle immense amounts of debt off to a soon-to-beindependent subsidiary and reap substantial a windfall in the process.97
Complications related to intellectual property and post-employment
benefits are likewise common sources of friction. 98 At bottom, the issues
that arise in an individual situation depend largely on (a) the business goals
of the separation transaction, (b) the degree to which the businesses were
integrated before the transaction, (c) the extent of the continuing
relationships between the businesses after the transaction, (d) the structure
of the transaction, and (e) the desire to obtain tax-free treatment of the
spin-off. 99
Where does antitrust fit in? Even among those corporate law firms
seen as pushing the spin-off frontier, concerns over potential antitrust
liability are acknowledged only in general terms, 100 and often as somewhat
of an afterthought. For example, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a leader
in the practice area, advises:
Any IPO or spin-off involving overlapping ownership
structures or boards raises potential U.S. antitrust issues
and should be analyzed from this perspective. These
See Alexandros P. Prezas, & Karen Simonyan, Corporate Divestitures: Spin-offs vs.
Sell-offs, 34 J. CORP. FIN. 83, 104 (2015).
94
Id.
95
Owers & Sergi, supra note 84, at 7.
96
E.g., In re Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 429 B.R. 73, 93 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010).
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 02CV00373, 2016 WL 660902,
at *25 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2016) aff’d sub nom. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 855
F.3d 553 (4th Cir. 2017) (exploring issues related to employees’ retirement savings and
consequences of a spin-off from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company).
99
See generally WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64.
100
See id. at 32.
93
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issues could arise under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
(which prohibits concerted action among competitors)
and Section 8 of the Clayton Act (which prohibits
interlocking directors and/or officers in many competing
corporations). 101
Compared to the rest of Wachtell’s Spin-off Guide, this cautionary flag
is weak and denigrates antitrust concern to the narrow space between noncompete agreements and interlocking directorates – two issues that could
create trouble for a parent board with or without consideration of effects
on competition – and never mentions the possibility of Section 2 liability.
As discussed above, courts scrutinize dual directorships in contested spinoff transactions for breach of the duty of loyalty. 102 Similarly, depending
on the scope of a non-compete agreement, the terms of the agreement may
be enough to disqualify the transaction as a device under section 355. 103
That said, a mere finding of a dual directorship does not create the type of
overlapping corporate relationship necessary to state a claim for relief
under an antitrust theory. 104 The same is true of continuing agreements
between ParentCo and SpinCo after the transaction is complete: a
continuing agreement is not enough to sustain an antitrust claim. 105
Spin-off transactions carried out for legitimate business purposes and
in which the ParentCo relinquishes at least eighty percent of the control
will not raise antitrust issues under current law. 106 But as the remainder of
this Note explores, spin-offs that start from a position of considerable
market power may have anticompetitive effects not well-suited for
detection under existing doctrines.

101

Id.
See U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 817 F.Supp. 2d 934, 941-45
(D. Tex. 2011).
103
I.R.C. § 355; see also S. Tulsa Pathology Lab’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 84, 100
(2002) (finding demand for binding and enforceable covenants not to compete does not
constitute a corporate business purpose within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.355–
2(d)(3)(ii) and, therefore, is insufficient to overcome the substantial evidence of device).
104
See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1983); but see Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Directors Resign from the Boards of Five Companies in
Response to Justice Department Concerns about Potentially Illegal Interlocking
Directorates (Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/directors-resign-boards-fivecompanies-response-justice-department-concerns-about-potentially.
105
See United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 249 F. Supp. 154, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
106
As noted above, control is defined as eighty percent of the voting power and eighty
percent of each class of non-voting stock. I.R.C. § 368(c); Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B.
115.
102
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COMPETITIVE HARMS RELATED TO SPIN-OFFS

Several features of spin-off transactions make them particularly suited
to abuse and give rise to anticompetitive risk at various points on the spinoff timeline. 107 For one, during Phase I, a parent corporation, specifically
one starting from a dominant market position, may select like-kind assets
to break off in an effort to add competitors (or allies) to markets.108 Two,
as the process moves along, a parent corporation may build terms into the
spin-off agreements that would be categorically anticompetitive but for the
fact that, when negotiated, ParentCo and SpinCo are still in a parentsubsidiary relationship. Under current antitrust doctrine, 109 a parent
corporation could use its pre-spin status (parent-subsidiary) to shield
otherwise impermissible agreements from review—a sort of have-yourcake-and-eat-it-too-problem. Three, once the spin-off agreements are
executed and shares have been distributed, the issue is explicit collusion
masquerading as tacit collusion. And four, a spin-off motivated (even
partially) by subverting antitrust liability conflicts with public policy
against market monopolization. As the following sections explore, there
may be an anticompetitive advantage to breaking up on one’s own
terms. 110 Perhaps controlling the terms of the break-up translates into
controlling the market post-spin.

A.

Spinning-off Fictitious Competitors

One way to shoot down a Section 2 claim at the pleadings stage is to
change the pool of competitors. 111 Ordinarily, defendants argue they have
more competition than meets the eye by broadening the relevant market.
112
Defendants can try to broaden the relevant market two ways. One is to
get the judge to include more products in it; the other is to get the judge to
draw a wider geographic market that will include more participants. As to
See supra Part I, Subsection 2; see also timeline infra App. II.
Below, the Note refers to this strategy as “spinning-off fictitious competitors.” See
infra Part II, Section A. Though, it is worth acknowledging the conceptual difficulty in
defining whether a SpinCo, which is purposefully designed to compete but not too much,
is a “competitor” or an “ally.”
109
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984).
110
See, e.g., Healy, supra note 33.
111
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
112
Stepping back, under what’s usually called the “indirect” method of proving market
or monopoly power, the plaintiff defines the relevant market. That method includes both a
“product market” definition and a “geographic market” definition. Because evidence of
“the ability ‘to control prices or exclude competition’ . . . is ‘only rarely available, courts
more typically examine market structure in search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly
power.’” United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (first
quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., U.S. 563, 571 (1966); and then quoting United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
107
108
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the former, the argument goes, with the additional products, come
additional competitors, lower market share, and less market power.
Sometimes the alternative market definition approach is a hard sell. 113 A
more predictable route, however, would be to spin-off a strategically
organized business, which could deflate market share and drive the
competition calculus away from a finding that monopoly power lies with
the parent. Because courts often treat monopoly power as a threshold issue
of a Section 2 monopolization claim, 114 and, more to the point, because
plaintiffs often have only indirect evidence at their disposal to clear that
threshold, 115 the addition of an apparent competitor is extremely likely to
have far-reaching consequences. 116
The litigation between the Federal Trade Commission and Meta
(formerly known as Facebook) 117 provides ready illustration of the
anticompetitive danger possible when ParentCo defines the scope of
SpinCo during Phase I of a spin-off transaction. By way of background,
the FTC’s amended complaint alleges, “[Meta] holds monopoly power in
the market for personal social networking services (‘personal social
networking’ or ‘personal social networking services’) in the United States,
primarily due to its control of two of the largest and most profitable social
networks in the world, Facebook and Instagram.” 118 The Commission goes
on to say, “[Meta]’s course of conduct, as alleged herein, violates Section
2 of the Sherman Act and thus constitutes an unfair method of competition
in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).” 119 In
response to the FTC’s Amended Complaint, Meta moved to dismiss on the
See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604
(1985); McWane, Inc. v. FTC., 783 F.3d 814, 828-30 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding Federal
Trade Commission’s market definition over defendant’s objection on appeal); Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51-54 (upholding the district court’s relevant market definition). But
see, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018).
114
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71 (1966) (identifying “the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market” as an element of the offense of monopoly); see also infra
Part III.
115
That is, market definition and assigning market shares, then comparing the
defendant’s share to a monopoly-level threshold that’s often pegged at seventy percent or
sometimes a bit lower at approximately sixty percent. See Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d at
187 (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus.. 980 F.2d 171, 201 (3d Cir. 1992)).
116
See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2021) (explaining “the
existence of market power is at the heart of any monopolization claim”); see also Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117
See generally FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D.D.C. 2022) https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-dcd-1_20-cv-03590/pdf/USCOURTS-dcd1_20-cv-03590-1.pdf.
118
Substitute Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief [Public
Redacted Version] at 2, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF
No. 82.
119
Id. at 79.
113
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grounds that the FTC failed to allege a plausible factual basis that Meta
has and had a dominant share of the alleged personal social networking
services market. 120 Defendant’s motion has since been denied and the
parties are proceeding to discovery. 121
Part and parcel to the survival of the FTC’s monopolization claim is
its allegation that Meta maintained a dominant share of the relevant market
for U.S. personal social networking since 2011. 122 In its amended
complaint, the FTC alleges Meta controls a dominant share of the market
based on number of users and time-spent per user, although, it necessarily
concedes, no perfect metric exists for quantifying the market share of a
social networking platform. 123 In any event, the FTC’s case would have
fallen apart on Meta’s renewed motion to dismiss 124 and could still be
mooted if Meta were to spin-off Instagram. 125 One can imagine that, if the
contours of the FTC’s market-share definition flattened, a spin-off would
dramatically change pool of personal networking services competing for
users’ attention. 126 Post-spin, Instagram would be treated as a wholly
independent corporation and, thus, competitor of Meta’s “Facebook
Blue,” the social media network commonly known as “Facebook.”
Because a central theory of the FTC’s amended complaint boils down to
Meta not having enough competition because it has a practice of acquiring

120
See Memorandum in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the FTC’s
Amended Complaint at 7, Facebook Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34 (No. 20-3590).
121
See Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34.
122
Id. at 14.
123
See Substitute Amended Complaint, supra note 118, at 63. See also Facebook, Inc.,
581 F. Supp. 3d 34. at 46-51. Note, however, in the FTC original Complaint, the FTC
estimated market share in conclusory terms, alleging simply “[Meta] has maintained a
dominant share of the U.S. personal social networking market (in excess of 60%).”
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 18-19, Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021) ECF 51. The district court rejected the FTC’s allegation as “too
conclusory[.]” FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2021).
124
See generally Memorandum in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the
FTC’s Amended Complaint, No. 20-3590 (D.D.C Oct. 4, 2021).
125
Concededly, though, discovery may reveal that Facebook Blue is big enough to still
clear the monopoly-power market-share threshold. Cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 157 (1978) (“The law can usefully attack this
form of predation only when there is evidence of specific intent to drive others from the
market by means other than superior efficiency and when the predator has overwhelming
market size, perhaps 80 or 90 percent.”).
126
The FTC’s estimation of uses’ attention vis-à-vis daily and month users, and Meta’s
share of time-spent per user on any personal social network was critical to the district
court’s acceptance of the FTC’s amended complaint. Cf. FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F.
Supp. 3d 34, 46 (D.D.C. 2022) (“The FTC has now [sufficiently alleged market
dominance], adding substantial new allegations about the contours of Facebook’s market
share.”).
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would-be competitors, Meta could easily moot the FTC’s complaint by
spinning-off its choice competitor or competitors. 127
But would Instagram, in this hypothetical, stand in Meta’s way as a
legitimate competitor? Probably not. Meta has spent nearly a decade
integrating Instagram with Facebook and Meta’s other companies, like
WhatsApp, 128 Meta Business Suite, 129and Horizon Worlds. 130 Even if a
voluntary spin-off were to happen, Meta would never be forced to
completely partition Instagram’s functional links to Facebook – not under
the tax code and not under Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. 131
Similarly, a strong argument can be made that integration of Facebook and
Instagram is a better product and, therefore, promotes consumer welfare.
Lastly, in the unlikely event that an Instagram spin-off were to result in
complete separation, Meta would still be in the power seat. Meta’s
directors, which includes the majority shareholder, Mark Zuckerberg,
would decide to spin-off Instagram (or another personal social networking
service), and Instagram would be released into the market from the top of
the food chain, unlike most other insurgents in the tech space. 132 As Mr.
Zuckerberg admitted, adding and subtracting competitors in the social
networking space acts as a significant barrier to entry for others.
The complaint alleges that (1) Facebook’s share of the market puts it over the
monopoly-power threshold; and (2) Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp,
as well as its conditional-dealing policy vis-à-vis app developers, was anticompetitive,
exclusionary, and monopolistic conduct. See Substitute Amended Complaint, supra note
118, at 2.
128
See Announcement, Instagram Bus. Team, Find New Customers with Boosted Posts
That Drive to WhatsApp (Sept. 28, 2021), https://business.instagram.com/blog/instagramboost-ads-whatsapp-find-customers.
129
See Connect an Instagram account on Meta Business Suite Mobile App, META BUS.
HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/205428387437406?id=3349108371
785391 (last visited Nov. 12, 2022).
130
Amanda Silberling, No One Asked for This, But You Can Share Horizon Worlds
Videos to Instagram Reels, TECHCRUNCH, (Oct. 11, 2022, 1:48 PM), https://tech
crunch.com/2022/10/11/horizon-worlds-instagram-reels/.
131
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021) (“Copyright on largely
functional elements of software that [have] become an industry standard gives a copyright
holder anti-competitive power” (quoting Brief of the Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (No.
18—956))). Invariably, the software that integrates Instagram and Facebook is owned by
Facebook. Although, this too, should be fleshed out as discovery proceeds in FTC v. Meta
Platforms, Inc., Civil Action No. 20-3590 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022), ECF No. 207.
132
See Jeffrey Goldfarb, Zuckerberg Motivates supervoting Stock Resistance, REUTERS,
(Oct. 27, 2022, 2:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/zuckerberg-motivatessupervoting-stock-resistance-2022-10-27/; see also Katie Canales, ‘The Most Powerful
Person Who’s Ever Walked the Face Of The Earth’: How Mark Zuckerberg’s Stranglehold
on Facebook Could Put the Company at Risk, BUS. INSIDER, (Oct. 13, 2021, 7:09 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-control-facebook-whistleblower-keyman-risk-2021-10
127
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[O]ne way of looking at this is that what we’re really
buying is time. Even if some new competitors spring[] up,
buying Instagram, Path, Foursquare, etc now will give us
a year or more to integrate their dynamics before anyone
can get close to their scale again. Within that time, if we
incorporate the social mechanics they were using, those
new products won’t get much traction since we’ll already
have their mechanics deployed at scale. 133
This rationale is akin to the anticompetitive strategy undertaken by Ski
Co. in Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation in
the late seventies and early eighties: “[S]acrifice short-run benefits and
consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its
smaller rival.” 134 Aspen Ski suggests courts should be hostile toward the
kind of market tinkering contemplated by a hypothetical Meta/Instagram
spin-off. In no uncertain terms, the Court explained, an effort to change
the character of an entire market without a concomitant efficiency
justification “supports an inference that the monopolist made a deliberate
effort to discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller
rival[.]” 135
The kind of anticompetitive conduct implicated by using spin-offs to
add distance between oneself and one’s real competition—insurgent firms
and incipient threats—is particularly insidious because of its potential for
long-term effects. For one, section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code
severely disincentivizes an acquisition of or merger with a newly spun-off
corporation. 136 Two, ParentCo’s are unrestrained in their ability to infuse
anti-takeover provisions, such as staggered board structures, in SpinCo’s
charter and bylaws. Anti-takeover provisions double as added layer of
protections around an anticompetitive play to entrench parent-favorable
provisions in spin-off agreements. Though not for openly anticompetitive
purposes, law firms advising parent corporations often suggest adding
takeover defenses as a matter of practice. 137 And three, ParentCo may

Substitute Amended Complaint, supra note 118, at 23.
472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985). Herbert Hovenkamp elegantly explains the so-called
Aspen Ski problem in his article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago. See Hovenkamp, supra
note 12, at 280-83.
135
Aspen Skiing, 471 U.S. at 608-10. Note, however, the Court later placed Aspen Ski to
“at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability[.]” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
136
See I.R.C. § 355 (b), (d); see also Birkeland et al., supra note 3 (discussing plan
presumption and disqualification of property from tax-free treatment).
137
This advice is based on the observation that a newly spun-off company, especially
when accompanied by an IPO, is particularly vulnerable to takeover, making antitakeover
133
134
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specify everything from name to branding and functionality requirements
in the governance documents and separation agreements it authors. 138
Going back to the Meta/Instagram example, in the spin-off documents,
Meta could require Instagram to keep the feature, which allows users to
automatically share their Instagram content to Facebook. 139 Vice versa,
Meta can also require that Instagram allow Facebook users to
automatically share their Facebook content to Instagram. While this
example may seem superficial, at scale it has important implications for
the public’s (and market’s) perception of Meta, Facebook, and Instagram
as truly separate entities. Where functionality overlaps in ways users
readily perceive, it is less likely that Instagram will be able to separate
itself from Facebook and stand as an independent competitor. Rather,
Instagram SpinCo is likely to continue to buttress a protective “moat”
around Facebook, and therefore Meta, by virtue of the fact that Facebook
has only incentives to tie itself to Instagram by the terms of the spin. 140
The harm to consumers is not only innovation that may never be realized,
but more importantly, the cross-sharing feature ensures Meta will never
lose sight of Instagram user data. “[L]ack of innovation, decreased privacy
and data protection, . . . and general lack of consumer choice” make it
more plausible that the conduct is a “harm to the competitive process and
thereby harm [to] consumers” than innocent, business-motivated
conduct. 141
The consequences of an allegedly monopolistic corporation, like
Meta, devising the competitors it wants vitiate settled antitrust principles.
In the above hypothetical, when Meta engineers Instagram to be an enemy
of its true competitors, it manufactures a friend. Additional trouble arises
for the market because the SpinCo’s contemplated by large digital
platforms are not ordinary SpinCo’s. Instagram, AWS, and YouTube
would be formidable forces, added from the top of the market, and would
have competitive effects strategically directed away from its parent. That
the confluence of generally accepted spin-off practices and interrelated
markets potentiate long-term effects makes understanding and preventing
provisions important from the outset. See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note
64 at 23-24.
138
Id. at 22.
139
More information on “Post to Other Accounts” feature is available on Instagram’s
help page. See Linking Accounts, INSTAGRAM: HELP CENTER, https://help.instagram.com/
1094643983940381 (last visited Aug. 30, 2022).
140
See Substitute Amended Complaint, supra note 118, at 22 (“Facebook’s strategy to
prevent innovative entrants from gaining scale and benefiting from network effects has
consisted of acquiring innovators and—where possible—transforming their products into
integral parts of the company’s competitive “moat.”).
141
See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 3d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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anticompetitive spin-offs even more of a priority. And it may be worth
flagging that the issue — i.e., spinning off subsidiaries to diminish
monopoly power — arises with spin-offs designed to inflate the pool of
competitors as well as those designed to make a parent company appear
smaller in a different market, the latter of which this Note takes up in
Section IV.

B.

Pre-spin Sources of Anticompetitive Conduct

Recall first that ParentCo is absolutely responsible for drafting the
spin-off documents. Corporate law requires ParentCo to drive the
transaction because a wholly controlled subsidiary lacks the requisite
autonomy otherwise needed to break itself off from ParentCo 142 even if
future SpinCo directors and officers may participate in the negotiations. 143
Then note, except for rules against devices and plans, parent corporations
are virtually unrestrained in defining SpinCo’s governance structure,
business purpose, capital structure, lender relationships, physical
infrastructure, and so forth. This power extends to determining whether a
relationship between itself (ParentCo) and SpinCo will be on-going, the
products or services to be delivered by SpinCo, and the framework for how
SpinCo will relate to other wholly controlled subsidiaries or, in the case of
a simultaneous spin-off, other SpinCo’s. 144 Importantly, even where
relationships and limits are not precisely defined in the spin-off
documents, it is safe to assume that they could easily be communicated
during the six to eight months of negotiations and planning. Yet, the Court
has interpreted the Sherman Act as exempting contracts and combinations
agreed upon by a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary from Section 1
liability. 145
In Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation, five
justices answered in the negative the question of whether a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were legally capable of
conspiring with each other under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 146 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger limited the holding, explaining, “[w]e
do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable
for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely
own.” 147 Though Copperweld had the doctrinal effect of repudiating the
“intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine”, the decision stopped short of a
See, e.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988).
143
See WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 64, at 14.
144
See generally Birkeland et al., supra at note 3.
145
See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984).
146
Id. at 767. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
147
Id.
142
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blanket exemption from antitrust liability whenever parent and wholly
owned subsidiaries are involved.
Any anticompetitive activities of corporations and their
wholly owned subsidiaries meriting antitrust remedies
may be policed adequately without resort to an intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. A corporation’s initial
acquisition of control will always be subject to scrutiny
under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Thereafter, the enterprise is
fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 . . . . [T]hese statutes are adequate to control
dangerous anticompetitive conduct . . . . 148
A significant reason for the Court’s decision to repudiate the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was the observation that it resulted in
different treatment for corporations with unincorporated divisions and
corporations with incorporated separate divisions. 149 As noted by the
Court, many corporations choose to incorporate divisions for a variety of
business reasons, not the least of which is to avoid taxes. 150 And to five
members of the Court, it did not make sense that antitrust liability should
turn on the mere form an enterprise took without consideration of its
substance. 151
The necessary premise of the Copperweld decision, however, is the
fact that the subsidiary is wholly owned. Since the subsidiary is wholly
owned, i.e., the parent is the only “shareholder,” it follows that the interest
of the parent and the wholly-owned subsidiary are always the same.
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest . . . . With or without a formal
“agreement,” the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the
parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly
owned subsidiary do “agree” to a course of action, there
is no sudden joining of economic resources that had

Id. at 777.
Id. at 774.
150
Id. at 772-73.
151
Id. at 773 (“If antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was
clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into
unincorporated divisions.”).
148
149
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previously served different interests, and there is no
justification for § 1 scrutiny. 152
The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he Sherman Act contains a basic
distinction between concerted and independent action.” 153 Concerted
action, the Court tells us, “deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decision-making that competition assumes and demands.” 154
Whereas independent or unilateral action, “does not represent a sudden
joining of two independent sources of economic power previously
pursuing separate interests[.]” 155 But critics of the Copperweld decision
have opined that the distinction is far more imagined than real.156 Professor
Mark S. Poposky adds that indistinguishable classes of conduct, marked
by inconsistent characterization, are ill-suited for the making of safe
harbor rules under Section 1. 157 Instead, Professor Poposky concludes,
courts should “ask if the unilateral conduct in question really is different
from other conduct, how it is different, and whether those differences
justify distinct legal treatment.” 158
So too here. Blindly treating action by one business form (parentsubsidiary) differently than action of another (ParentCo and SpinCo) risks
missing the point that a change in form is not necessarily accompanied by
a change in substance, i.e., a divergence in interests. As should be clear by
now, this Note takes the position that concerted action, pre-spin, is no
different in substance than if the same concerted action took place postspin (assuming the spin-off goes through to completion). 159 Taken to an
extreme, concerted pre-spin agreements could go one step beyond the
Copperweld concern over depriving the market of independent actors.
Agreements made pre-spin may very well have the effect of depriving the
market of detecting the moment when two interests became one because,
well, they were one all along. 160 Here again, consumers are harmed by the
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
Id. at 767 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
154
Id. at 769.
155
Id. at 771.
156
See, e.g., Mark S. Poposky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1265, 1266-67 (2008).
157
Id. at 1280 (“To justify a safe harbor for a particular class of conduct requires courts
to distinguish that conduct from other conduct.”).
158
Id. at 1296.
159
If a spin-off were to be abandoned pre-distribution, then pre-spin agreements would
fall short of conspiracy under the generous protection of the intraenterprise immunity
doctrine. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776.
160
Cf. Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221, 1235-36 (10th
Cir. 2017) (finding nothing in Copperweld insulates a group of affiliated companies from
152
153
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fact that pre-spin agreements lock innovation in place. Companies may
ignore consumer preferences with the same assurance against loss as
existed before the spin-off because the pre-spin agreement removes any
threat that SpinCo will improve upon ParentCo’s product, and vice-versa.

C.

Continued Ties

From a practical standpoint, because a spin-off necessarily requires
substantial coordination and agreement between two entities in the leadup to separation, much of the groundwork for collaboration over market
power will have already taken place by the time separation occurs and will
be protected from antitrust scrutiny under Copperweld. 161 So, by the time
papers are executed and shares are distributed, the horse has already left
the barn.
Coordinated interaction includes a range of conduct. It may involve
the explicit negotiation of a common understanding of how corporations
will compete or refrain from competing. 162 Such conduct, if undertaken
among formally separate competitors, would typically violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. But it also might involve more subtle action. As Judge
Posner explained, “in some circumstances competing sellers might be able
to coordinate their pricing without conspiring in the usual sense of the
term—that is, without any overt or detectable acts of communication. This
is the phenomenon . . . which I prefer to call ‘tacit collusion[.]’” 163 And
here—in the realm of tacit collusion—is where the post-spin activity of
ParentCo’s and SpinCo’s is more likely to fall.
The Supreme Court did not contribute to the common law of tacit
collusion until 1993, when it decided Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 164 Brooke Group involved a market
struggle between an incumbent generic cigarette producer, Brooke Group
Ltd. (“Liggett”), and a new entrant, Brown & Williamson, in the generic
cigarette market. Liggett alleged Brown & Williamson cut prices on
generic cigarettes below cost and engaged in a price war at the wholesale
level, which amounted to price discrimination and a reasonable possibility
of injuring competition in violation of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act. 165
antitrust liability when it is alleged the family of companies unlawfully monopolized as a
single enterprise).
161
See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 776.
162
See e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 224-25 (1939).
163
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 52-53 (2d ed. 2001).
164
509 U.S. 209 (1993).
165
Id. at 216-17. The essence of Liggett’s claim was that business rival “priced its
products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition and thereby
gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant market.” Id. at 222. Although Leggitt
brought its claims under Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson–
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The tacit collusion portion of the claim came about because Liggett
contended Brown & Williamson worked in parallel with other cigarette
companies to exert pressure on Liggett to raise its prices. 166 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained, “tacit collusion . . . describes
the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market
might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profitmaximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic
interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output
decisions.” 167 Justice Kennedy and five other justices, however, were not
convinced that firms would adopt a predatory pricing scheme without
express coordination. 168 It would be a stretch to believe in the success of
such a lofty scheme, the Court said, because “[f]irms that seek to recoup
predatory losses through the conscious parallelism of oligopoly must rely
on uncertain and ambiguous signals to achieve concerted action.” 169
A parent corporation and its former subsidiary, however, are unlike
the insurgent firm and rival oligopolists in Brooke Group. Take, for
instance, a spin-off involving the App Store from Apple. The App Store
will enter the relevant market as a well-established, formidable force. The
app store market will be a relatively stable oligopoly. 170 And at the time of
this writing, Apple will have spent well over a decade developing,
optimizing, and controlling the App Store. 171 Without even touching upon
the considerable pre-spin planning certain to occur, the situation, here,
shores up all of the weaknesses the Court noted in Brooke Group. That is,
the App Store would enter the market with a pre-existing and longstanding interdependence with Apple; Apple would continue to produce
its proprietary apps; 172 the App Store’s entry would be preceded by express
agreements defining its future business relationship with Apple; and the
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. Section 13(a), the Court explained the requirement
for a predatory pricing claim are the same whether brought under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act or primary-line price discrimination under the Robinson–Patman Act. See id.
166
Id. at 227.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. The Court went on to provide several other reasons why it rejected Leggitt’s tacit
collusion claim, including instability in the relevant market at the time of the events, the
depressed power of the allegedly predatory firm, and the lack of supporting price data. See
id. at 227-39.
170
David Curry, App Store Data (2022), BUSINESS OF APPS (Aug. 31, 2022), https://
www.businessofapps.com/data/app-stores/ (reporting “[o]utside of China, Apple and
Google control more than 95 percent of the app store market share through iOS and
Android, respectively.”).
171
See the App Store turns 10, APPLE NEWSROOM (Jul. 5, 2018), https://www.apple.com/
newsroom/2018/07/app-store-turns-10/.
172
For example, Mail, Contacts, Notes, Calendar, Garage Band, iMovie, Music, Photos,
Messages, and Camera are examples of Apple’s proprietary apps.
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App Store and Apple could recoup predatory losses 173 by consciously,
though inexplicitly, adhering to pre-spin agreements beyond the lifespan
of the agreement. The existence of the pre-spin agreements is what
differentiates the App Store hypothetical from Brooke Group.
Yet the two-prong test announced in Brooke Group is unlikely to
detect the kind of tacit collusion argued to flow from the kinds of
anticompetitive spin-offs at issue in this Note. 174 As a starting point,
Brooke Group teaches, in oligopoly markets, proof of expected
interdependent behavior (i.e., tacit coordination) is insufficient. 175 There
also needs to be a substantial evidence demonstrating the parties’
conscious commitment to a common plan or scheme to fix prices. 176 But
bringing forth that evidence before discovery is challenging. For one, prespin dealings—express and covert—touch upon the whole gamut of secret
information, not just cost and supply information. 177 Thus, SpinCo enters
the market with a predetermined understanding in place and ParentCo
already knows what signals to look for. Second, because the collusive
behavior will be preceded by spin-off agreements that are permitted to
allocate losses and gains between the firms, post-spin, the “incentive to
cheat” is much lower if present at all. 178 And third, that pre-spin
agreements are necessary to any spin-off transaction makes courts more
likely to treat them as ancillary agreements and creates a barrier to
prosecuting post-spin collusion under a theory that there was an
impermissible advance understanding. Courts are reluctant to expose
Predatory loses may be due to underpricing their respective apps and enforcing
developer-unfriendly agreements.
174
See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318–
19 (2007) (“‘First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival’s
low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of
its rival’s costs.’ Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘the competitor had . . . a
dangerous probabilit[y] of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.’”) (first quoting
Brooke Grp., 509 U.S., at 222; and then quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224).
175
“The inquiry is whether, given the aggregate losses caused by the below-cost pricing,
the intended target would likely succumb . . . [and if so] whether it would likely injure
competition in the relevant market.” Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225.
176
See id. at 233; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984) (“[T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that
reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others ‘had a conscious commitment
to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’” (quoting Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980))).
177
See EDWARD J. GREEN ET AL., TACIT COLLUSION IN OLIGOPOLY 21-23 (2013).
(acknowledging differences between the legal requirements necessary to sustain a finding
of full collusion and economic models of price-setting games.) Different from the Court’s
contention in Brooke Group, Green et al. argue imperfect, ambiguous, or incomplete
signals are enough to sustain some level of collusion. See id.
178
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986).
173
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defendants to treble damage liability and permit an anticompetitive
agreement to be inferred from a natural or normal course of business. 179
Continued-ties potentiate two new species of competitive harm,
increased prices and decreased output. The agreements essentially reduce
or eliminate the host of uncertainties that disincentivize firms from
engaging in long-term speculative behavior that cannot be enforced.
ParentCo is unrestricted in tax law from drafting prices, production
restrictions, and tie-outs into spin-off agreements. Even the most flagrant
restraints seem to be immune from action under Copperweld. It is an
anomaly that independent competitors could have “the ability to raise price
profitably by restricting output” simply because, as parent and subsidiary,
they so agreed. 180

D.

Maintained Control of Markets

The main goal of a structural remedy is to redistribute power in the
market to the “baseline condition that would have prevailed in the market
but for the defendant’s anticompetitive acts.” 181 In designing structural
remedies, the focus should be on restoring competition without harming
consumers. 182 On one hand, spin-off transactions may well serve this end
and do so without impacting shareholder value. On the other hand, spinoffs may enable a conglomerate firm to indirectly retain ownership control
over the market segment it supposedly spun-off when the majority
shareholder of the parent serves on the parent board or exercises de facto
or de jure control of the board. 183
Recall that in a spin-off transaction, shares of SpinCo are distributed
to the shareholders of ParentCo. 184 From there, regular-way trading
begins, and interests are further distributed across the market. 185 But in the
context of a spin-off conducted by a large conglomerate organization,
particularly where founders retain majority shares, ownership interests
may not be dispersed in the usual manner and, instead, remain with the
majority shareholder(s) of ParentCo.
See e.g., Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763.
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 5.01 (4th ed. 2017)).
181
John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves
Consumers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 691, 700 (2001).
182
Id.
183
ParentCo retains ownership control through a common majority stockholders. See
supra, Part I. Majority ownership in a parent corporation translates into majority ownership
in a newly independent spin-off corporation.
184
See supra Part I.
185
Regular-way trading begins assuming the spin-off was accompanied by a SpinCo IPO.
See infra App. I.
179
180
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The danger of this outcome hearkens back to the 1911 breakup of
Standard Oil. There, the Court ordered the dissolution of the trust by
directing the combination to distribute the stock of thirty-seven
subsidiaries to its shareholders and created a number of sizable, enduring,
independent competitors, today known as Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, and
Mobil. 186 The AT&T divestiture followed a similar pattern: In 1984,
AT&T was broken up into seven “Baby Bells,” which by 2018 had reagglomerated as the modern-day telecommunications giant, AT&T.187
The main difference, of course, Standard Oil and AT&T involved some
intervention and supervision by the federal government. And even under
government supervision, managed to re-conglomerate over the course of
several decades. 188 A spin-off pursued by Amazon, Apple, Meta, etc.,
would occur largely outside of government view, save for mandatory tax
and securities filing. One consequence of extra-regulatory divestiture is
freedom of the parent to put strategies in place geared toward preserving
market power and control.
Consider a hypothetical Amazon/AWS spin-off. 189 Of the relatively
little information publicly available about AWS’s relationship to Amazon
is that “[Amazon] leverage[s] a shared infrastructure that supports both
[Amazon’s] internal technology requirements and external sales to AWS
customers.” 190 Elsewhere in Amazon’s filing, it becomes clear that the
“infrastructure” is a technological infrastructure. 191 So, if AWS supports
Amazon’s internal technology requirements, a spin-off is unlikely to
change the interdependence of AWS and Amazon. 192 To the extent that
Amazon is a newly paying customer of AWS with great buying power,
much of Amazon’s purchase payments will be returned to Amazon’s
shareholders. 193 Though an AWS spin-off is likely to change the
economics of its relationship with Amazon because Amazon will be a

William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct,
31 CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1310 (1999).
187
See generally Randal C. Picker, The Arc of Monopoly: A Case Study in Computing,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 523, 530 (2020).
188
See e.g., id.
189
Beginning with its 2016 annual filing, Amazon began reporting Amazon Web
Services (“AWS”) as a separate reportable segment. See Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) 3 (Jan. 28, 2016).
190
Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 27 (Feb. 2, 2021).
191
See id. at 66 (“Technology infrastructure assets are allocated among the segments
based on usage, with the majority allocated to the AWS segment.”).
192
See App. III.
193
See generally Stephen Ayers, The Next $1 Trillion Company Lies, Surprise, Inside
Amazon’s Cloud, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 19, 2021, 11:43 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/
article/4450657-next-1-trillion-company-lies-surprise-inside-amazons-cloud.
186
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paying customer, nothing in section 355 or the common law requires
Amazon to disentangle itself from AWS.
At a high level, the transaction becomes circular: Amazon pays AWS
for cloud services, AWS returns value to Amazon shareholders. This
circularity perpetuates Amazon and AWS’s market share, though,
Amazon would still very much control the cloud computing market by
virtue of its purchasing power and overlap in majority shareholders. The
point is, while an AWS spin-off may not be worse than no spin-off (i.e.,
where AWS remains a wholly-owned subsidiary of Amazon), an AWS
spin-off is likely worse than a court-ordered sell-off because Amazon
stockholders would still hold the reigns of AWS.
Of course, inventing the best mousetrap (or cloud service) is not an
antitrust violation. But using that invention to perpetuate a dominant
position does raise antitrust concerns, particularly when it leads to control
in two separate but related markets. Inevitably, would-be innovators never
enter the market because the cost of failing is so great. 194 The threat that
spin-offs ineffectively de-concentrate monopoly power is analogous to the
threat posed by agglomerative mergers: it becomes very difficult to
unscramble, then re-scramble the eggs a different way. 195

III.

DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST

The Sherman Act prohibits agreements “in restraint of trade,” 196 and
“monopoliz[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce.” 197 But the Sherman Act, for as much as it stands for antitrust
action in the United States, is little more than a relic of Congress’s call to
courts to “develop a federal common law of competition.” 198 While a
detailed analysis of the interplay between antitrust’s statutory anchors and
common law process is beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that judges
are primarily responsible for setting the doctrinal anchors is pertinent.199
See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 262-67.
William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the HartScott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 830 (1997) (“Once a merger takes place and the
firms’ operations are integrated, it can be very difficult, or impossible, to unscramble the
eggs and reconstruct a viable, divestable group of assets.”). But cf. Rory Van Loo, In
Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1955,
1998-2006 (2020). Professor Van Loo suggests several ways to improve the
administrability of antitrust remedies.
196
15 U.S.C. § 1.
197
15 U.S.C. § 2.
198
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 269.
199
See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & A. Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common
Law: American Express and the Evolution of Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2064-65
(2020).
194
195
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The analysis that follows does so in view of the broad objective of
modern antitrust policy and the basic elements of any antitrust violation.
The overarching objective of antitrust is to protect competition to promote
consumer welfare. 200 Antitrust laws forbid only those business practices
that tend to restrain competition unreasonably, or that fortify a monopoly
or threatened monopoly thereby leaving consumers worse off. 201
“Restraints that are not unreasonable per se are judged under the ‘rule of
reason.’” 202 Given the total absence of case law on spin-off transactions as
alleged antitrust violations, this Note looks only at doctrines that arise
under a rule of reason standard. 203 Finally, there are two basic elements of
an antitrust violation under the rule of reason standard as applied Sherman
Act claims: market power and anticompetitive conduct. 204
An antitrust plaintiff must prove the defendant possessed market
power. Under the Sherman Act, “[m]arket power is the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” 205
Here, courts consider the but-for world caused by the anticompetitive
conduct to approximate the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition: 206 but for the leading firm’s market power, “competitive
forces or the entry of new firms could discipline the conduct of the leading
firm[.]” 207 Market power is bounded by the relevant competitive market,
which has a geographical component and a product component. 208 Though
market share and market power often go together, the finding of one does
not always predict the existence of the other. And perhaps for that reason,
the trend has been away from the rule in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
“The goal is to ‘distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are
harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s
best interest.’” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284, (2018) (quoting Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).
201
See id. at 2283.
202
Id. at 2284 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
203
“It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.” United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972). Given courts’ total lack of experience with spin-offs
under antitrust scrutiny, a court would be hard-pressed to justify applying a per se rule and
never inquiring into the reasonableness of the transaction. See also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 1551, 1557 (1979).
204
Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2018).
205
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984).
206
See, e.g., Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir.
1996).
207
Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined
(last visited Oct. 9, 2022).
208
See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 828 (11th Cir. 2015).
200
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which allowed courts to infer monopoly power on a finding of
predominant market share. 209
Courts define anticompetitive conduct in terms of harm to the
competitive process, that is, anything other than competition on the
merits. 210 “[The] focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the
intent behind it.” 211 Anticompetitive conduct may be rebutted by
presenting evidence that the course of conduct was pursued for a legitimate
business purpose or procompetitive end. 212 Although anticompetitive
conduct can take several forms (e.g. exclusive dealing, refusal to deal,
predatory pricing, etc.), practices generally fall into one of two categories,
single-firm conduct and “agreements,” which can be either horizontal
(among rivals) or vertical (between firms operating at different levels of a
supply chain). 213 Because spin-offs straddle the line between single-firm
conduct and dealings with competitors, it is of less utility to distinguish by
category. For that reason, the following Section examines anticompetitive
conduct with respect to the spin-off timeline.

A.

Power Analyses

The reason traditional tests inadequately capture power in spin-off
transactions relates to the view of a spin-off transaction as a dividend
distribution on one hand, and a creation of business (or businesses) on the
other. Market power analyses allocate percentages on a firm-by-firm
basis. 214 But in a spin-off transaction, the form taken by a firm is a moving
target. In other words, the business substance stays constant and the
business form changes. Doctrinally, it makes little sense to elevate form
over substance. Instead, the proper focus should be on market power and
marketplace effects.

384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]o be
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an “anticompetitive effect.” That
is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers.”); see also Morgan
v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1358 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Anticompetitive conduct is conduct
without legitimate business purpose that makes sense only because it eliminates
competition.” (citing Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th
Cir. 1987))).
211
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59.
212
See id. at 72; see also Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 (1966) (explaining “a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident” is distinct from anticompetitive conduct).
213
See Anticompetitive Practices, FED. TRADE. COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/anticompetitive-practices (last visited Oct. 9, 2022).
214
See, for example, United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49, 71-73
(D.D.C. 2011), in which the court assigned market shares to all the firms participating in
the relevant market.
209
210
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1. Reverse-Copperweld Attribution Regime
An oft-quoted line from the Copperweld decision likens a parent and
its wholly owned subsidiary to “a multiple team of horses drawing a
vehicle under the control of a single driver.” 215 Lower courts gravitated to
this easy-to-understand metaphor in applying what came to be known as
the power-to-control test. 216
Subsequent cases clarify that the power-to-control test cuts both ways.
First, in the sense that a unified corporate conscious immunizes two or
more actors from conspiring, contracting, or combining in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. And second, enlarging market share by
attributing the share of both to the identity of one. For companies, looking
to spin-off subsidiaries to (1) make their competition look greater (e.g.,
Meta) or (2) make themselves look smaller in one or more markets (e.g.
Google, Amazon, and Apple), the bidirectional potential of Copperweld is
a double-edged sword. 217 In other words, if common ownership can
exempt collusive conduct on one hand, 218 then common ownership should
enlarge market share on the other.
The latter, “reverse” Copperweld test, is critical to making sense of
the power dynamics that spin-offs exert on markets. Likewise, because
most of the hypothetical antitrust situations in this Note are most likely to
arise as monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 219
capturing the market share of commonly owned post-spin entities is likely
to be outcome determinative on the issue of monopoly power. 220 Section

Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
See, e.g., Pink Supply Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc., 788 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1986)
(finding manufacturer incapable of conspiring with sales agent, despite separate
incorporation); Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the two
separately incorporated racetracks, controlled by identical shareholders were incapable of
conspiring); Arandell Corp. v. Centerpoint Energy Servs., Inc., 900 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir.
2018).
217
Arguably, these two “alternatives” might be viewed as one in the same. But from a
rebuttal standpoint, the evidence a defendant may use to make itself look smaller differs
from the evidence a defendant may use to make its competition look greater.
218
See Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Prod. Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th Cir.
1984) (extending single entity treatment to two companies owned by three different men
because “[b]oth corporations were under the common ownership and control of these three
men”); Guzowski, 969 F.2d at 214; see also Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330,
344 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[M]ajority ownership with its centralized power to control, whether
or not apparently exercised in detail on a day-to-day basis, presumptively creates a single
entity for antirust purposes.”) (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1467a
(1986)).
219
15 U.S.C. § 2.
220
Judge Learned Hand’s decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. is often
credited with popularizing the inference of market power from market share. 148 F.2d 416
215
216
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2 monopolization cases require a greater showing of market power than
Section 1 cases. Because market share is generally assumed to be
positively correlated with market power (an increase of share leads to an
increase in power), attributing the “separate” share of SpinCo to the share
of ParentCo 221 increases the likelihood that ParentCo will be found to have
monopoly power. 222
For example, in the hypothetical Meta/Instagram spin-off
contemplated supra, Part II, reverse-Copperweld would prevent Meta
from artificially decreasing its share of the personal social networking
market by spinning-off Instagram in a heavily negotiated transaction. To
see how reverse-Copperweld might work, first consider Meta’s pre-spin
share of the personal social networking market that is attributable to
Facebook and Instagram. The FTC’s complaint alleges the combined
market share of Facebook and Instagram in the United States is
approximately eighty-five percent. 223 Data from another source
demonstrates seven out of ten social media users use Facebook daily, six
out of ten social media users use Instagram daily, and six out of ten social
media users use Snapchat daily. 224 Finally, 15.5% of Instagram users are
not also Facebook users, and 15.7% of Snapchat users are not also
Facebook users. 225 In absence of a reverse-Copperweld test, this data
paints the general picture that spinning-off Instagram would be like adding
another Snapchat to the market and simultaneously giving up a share
comparable to that of Snapchat. Post-spin, if Instagram’s share were
counted separately from Meta’s, then Meta’s share would (of course) be
lower.
Meta’s effective share of the market may not be reduced, however,
because (1) Facebook and Instagram could remain substantially integrated

(2d Cir. 1945). There, Judge Hand found that a market share of over ninety percent would
be sufficient to support a finding of monopoly. Id.
221
Assuming ParentCo is the alleged monopolist.
222
Leading scholars “believe it reasonable to presume the existence of substantial singlefirm market power from a showing that the defendant’s share of a well-defined market
protected by sufficient entry barriers has exceeded 70 or 75 percent for the five years
preceding the complaint.” 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 801a, at 383 (3d ed. 2008).
223
Based on time spent per month on personal social networking services. First Amended
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at ¶ 201, FTC v. Facebook, Inc. 581
F. Supp. 38 34 (D.D.C. 2022) (No. 20-3590). See also FTC v. Facebook, Inc., 581 F. Supp.
3d 34, 47–48 (D.D.C. 2022) (concluding “Facebook’s market share comfortably exceeds
the levels that courts ordinarily find sufficient to establish monopoly power[,]” i.e. greater
than 60-65%).
224
Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr.
7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/.
225
See id.
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with one another, 226 and (2) shares of Instagram’s stock would be
distributed to the same majority shareholders of Meta. So under a reverseCopperweld regime, SpinCo-Instagram’s market share would revert to
Meta at least in proportion to the shares distributed to Meta’s shareholders.
A reverse-Copperweld regime should be applied because it more
accurately captures the post-spin market share and, by consequence, postspin market power, than the typical entity-specific attribution scheme used
by courts today. In essence, the reverse-Copperweld regime captures the
otherwise ambiguous portion of the market ParentCo shareholder’s own
post-spin. 227 Professor Hovenkamp explains that, in most cases, the effect
of the monopolist’s conduct on the market is ambiguous, due in some part
to the static market fallacy. 228 “[I]n a real world market a court could not
consider whether a monopolist’s alleged exclusionary practice increased
or decreased total market demand, for the relevant information would not
be available.” 229 Reverse-Copperweld attempts to solve this problem by
tracing market share back to pre-spin structures.

2. Barriers to Entry
Up to now, this Note has discussed conduct and market characteristics
that occur contemporaneously with a Sherman Act violation. Entry
barriers are another equally important factor in finding impermissible
anticompetitive conduct. Entry barriers may affect downstream market
conditions and, consequently, downstream consumer welfare. 230 As the
name suggests, entry barriers are factors, such as certain regulatory
requirements, that prevent new rivals from timely responding to an
increase in price above the competitive level.231 While general reputation
alone is not an effective barrier to entry, when paired with some limiting
principle, such as industrial practice in a specific country, reputation can
act as proxy for factors that make new rivals less likely. 232 Other barriers
to entry include, “control of essential or superior resources[,]” 233
The extent of integration depends on how the spin-off is structured, but a value neutral
and, certainly, a value maximizing spin-off would keep existing integration features, like
cross-network sharing. See supra, Part II.
227
Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 283.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 283, n.322.
230
See generally HANNO F. KAISER, A PRIMER IN ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 14-15
(2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=381.
231
See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L. J. 1,3 (2006).
232
Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. F.T.C., 534 F.3d 410, 437 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Advo
Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202 & n. 11 (3d Cir.1995)).
233
Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir.1997).
226
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“[e]mployee skill levels required for a firm to be successful[,]” 234
“regulatory requirements, high capital costs, [and] technological
obstacles[.]” 235 Like market share, modern courts do not treat barriers to
entry as dispositive of monopolization, but rather treat entry barriers as
one component of stating a monopolization claim. 236
Spin-offs add two new wrinkles to the entry barriers calculus. The first
relates to the resources of SpinCo: unlike the typical new entrant (e.g.,
Brown & Williamson in Brooke Group), SpinCo can be expected to enter
the market well-capitalized, with an established consumer base, and at a
relatively high “position” in the market. In Big Tech oligopolies, these
advantages create added uncertainty and risk for would-be insurgent firms,
which is further compounded by the fast pace of technology markets in
general. 237 That is, SpinCo has an easy time entering the market and,
because of that ease, insurgent firms have an even harder time entering
than when structural separation occurs by court order.
The second wrinkle is a product of the spin-offs hypothesized in Part
II. A continuing relationship between SpinCo and ParentCo can create
advantages for each when ParentCo is an incumbent firm in one market
and SpinCo is an incumbent firm in another market. This is the
hypothetical Amazon/AWS problem. Amazon would continue to be a
significant player in the e-commerce market and AWS would retain
considerable share of the cloud computing market. 238 The two companies’
ability to continue to leverage the other’s status, post-spin, perpetuates prespin reputational barriers. At bottom, a justiciability issue post-spin – i.e.,
whether standing exists – arises because post-spin brand loyalty might be
a product of either the parent or subsidiary. 239 For instance, a plaintiff may
Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 976 (N.D.
Cal.1979).
235
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007).
236
Id. at 317 (citing Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc.,
159 F.3d 129, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We have held, in the context of a § 2 claim for attempted
monopolization, that a complaint must allege “something more” than mere market share,
such as “the strength of competition, probable development of the industry, the barriers to
entry, the nature of the anticompetitive conduct, and the elasticity of consumer demand.”)).
237
This comment refers to principles in corporate finance and firm valuation in efficient
markets. See BRATTON, supra note 35, at 132-42; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at
265.
238
See infra App III and Ayers, supra note 193.
239
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the Third Circuit laid out a five-factor
balancing test to assess antitrust standing. 501 F.3d at 320 (quoting Barton & Pittinos, Inc.
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997)). The first factor was “the
causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the intent
by the defendant to cause that harm.” Id. But see, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining plaintiffs in Section 2 cases must prove entry
barriers in order to prove monopoly power).
234
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be foreclosed from showing injury by AWS when the reputational barrier
is traced back to AWS’s former relationship to Amazon.

B.

ParentCo Liability

An anticompetitive play 240 made possible by a section 355 spin-off is
likely to harm markets and consumers and should be a categorically
unreasonable form of competition. Notwithstanding the hypothetical spinoffs discussed above, it is equally possible for a ParentCo or its SpinCo to
engage in monopolization or attempted monopolization under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Settled principles in antitrust allocate liability to the
actor, and parent companies are usually not fined for an antitrust
infringement of a subsidiary unless they are directly involved in the
antitrust infringement. 241 Similarly, the general rule in corporate law is that
parent companies are not liable for the actions of subsidiaries unless the
plaintiff can prove agency or an alter ego theory. 242
Because the parent corporation is wholly responsible for the
mechanics and terms of a spin-off, it more likely serves as the proper target
for antitrust allegations deriving from the decision to spin—up to a certain
point. 243 Courts and lawmakers will need to define the outer bounds of
ParentCo liability for SpinCo’s antitrust infringement, in addition to
settling the standing issues that will likely arise. 244 In terms of
administrability, a simple statute of limitations is most desirable.
However, given the complexity and variability of how spin-off
transactions are structured, a standard that incorporates some fact-based
analysis is likely necessary. One method might be to look at the
distribution of SpinCo voting shares around the conduct in question and
build in a look-back period to deter strategic changes stock positions.
Another method might be to look to the tax code, and pair ParentCo
liability to rules with the timeframes tax regulators scrutinize significant
transfers. 245

See supra Part II.
Carsten Koenig, Comparing Parent Company Liability in EU and US Competition
Law, 41 World Competition, 69, 69 (2018).
https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/World+Competition/41.1/WOCO2018004.
242
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998).
243
To permit ParentCo liability indefinitely runs the risk of chilling any use of spin-off
transactions because the risk of treble damages is so great.
244
For example, there is no vicarious liability rule and plaintiff is unlikely to be able to
satisfy pleading requirements without intervention from federal rule makers.
245
For example, I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(B) sets forth a time period of five years.
240
241
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Anticipated Objection: Some vs. No Separation

Where this Note attempts to expose anticompetitive uses of section
355 by alleged monopolies, some may be left wondering, well isn’t some
separation better than no separation? The literalist response would almost
certainly be “yes.” For one, separation might make anticompetitive
conduct more detectable, as in the case of spin-off agreements that go
beyond defining the terms of separation and venture into the realm of
collaborating to wield market power together. Clearly, if a subsidiary
remains wholly (or mostly) controlled by its parent, antitrust has no basis
to intervene in such collaboration. 246 Second and relatedly, perhaps in the
long run, the separation created by spin-offs genuinely leads to two
independent firms, innovation, and all the trappings of consumer
welfare. 247 Finally, there is the issue of transparency. Traditionally, postspin, the financial optics of the parent and its former subsidiary become
more transparent, and only then can analysts decipher which returns are
attributable to what business. 248 But what one gains in financial optics, one
loses in governance. As one conglomerate corporation, the whole world
knew the subsidiary marched to the beat of the parent corporation’s drum.
But, post-spin, to whom is the SpinCo board beholden? The shareholders
of ParentCo. And when the parent is Amazon, Meta, or Apple, the drum
beats loudly.

IV.

STRATEGIES FOR ALIGNING SPIN-OFFS WITH ANTITRUST
GOALS

Aligning section 355 of the tax code with the goals of antitrust requires
addressing competitive harms implicated by certain spin-off transactions.
This section proposes two general strategies on how to accomplish such
alignment. The first strategy involves a review process similar to that
which is currently applied to proposed mergers: A firm planning to spinoff a subsidiary would be required to submit a detailed plan and financial
and market data to antitrust enforcement agencies for review and
authorization. The second strategy gives courts the power to enjoin an
anticompetitive spin-off, like the legislative grant of power under Sections
13(b) and 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984).
One example of this ideal-case scenario is the eBay/PayPal spin-off in 2015. See Top
10 Questions About the eBay-PayPal Separation, EBAY: PRESS ROOM (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/top-10-questions-about-the-ebay-paypalseparation/.
248
See Owers & Sergi, supra note 84, at 3.
246
247
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Agency review of business transactions has served as an important
tool for antitrust enforcement. For example, in 1976, Congress passed the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (“HSR”). 249 Under the
HSR Act, the FTC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) receive merger
notifications concurrently and, through a clearance process, decide which
agency will investigate transactions that potentially raise issues under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 250 The HSR Act provides both a ‘size-oftransaction’ test and a ‘size-of-person’ test for determining whether a premerger filing is required. 251

1. Pre-spin Requirements
The HSR Act 252 does not require any filing for spin-offs, provided
SpinCo stock is distributed pro rata to ParentCo’s stockholders. That said,
the HSR Act offers a model for pre-spin reporting legislation designed to
help antitrust agencies detect and prevent anticompetitive spin-offs.
Here, government intervention envisions the kind of collaborative
opportunity Professor Rory Van Loo discusses in his piece, In Defense of
Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy. 253 Professor Van Loo
argues for antitrust remedies that are seen “less as an adversarial law
enforcement procedure and more as collaborative governance.” 254
Accordingly, collaborative governance in the pre-spin review context
should embrace collaborative governance strategies between the FTC and
the companies involved in the transaction, as well as leverage business
sector expertise to compensate for personnel and information
asymmetries. 255 Emphasis should be placed on creating a comment and
response process that is detailed but still comparable to the comment and
response process undertaken by the SEC when asked to approve spin-off
transactions.
As a starting point and like the HSR Act, the FTC and the DOJ should
have concurrent jurisdiction over the hypothetical “Spin Act”
notifications. Spin Act would be set up much like HSR to require pre-spin
notification and filing, but unlike the HSR Act, Spin Act would dispense

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–435, 90 Stat.
1383, 1390–94, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
250
Id.
251
Id. at § 18a(2).
252
Id.
253
Supra note 195.
254
Id. at 1960.
255
See id. at 1999-2001.
249
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of a mandatory waiting period in favor of earlier filing requirements. 256 At
least at implementation, the timeframe to provide notice will be paired
with the filing deadline for ParentCo’s 8-K; ParentCo will file a separate
spin notification with the FTC and DOJ after receiving initial approval
from the parent Board to proceed with the spin-off. In other words, initial
filing will take place approximately six months before distributing SpinCo
shares.
The required SEC filings before consummating a spin-off should
theoretically prevent corporations from accelerating or deviating from the
expected timeline. If, however, a parent corporation provides notice less
than ninety days before distribution, it could trigger a wait period. 257 To
facilitate a collaborative process between the agencies and corporations
planning spin-offs, parties may approach the agencies prior to the filing of
a Spin Act notification (or, in transactions that are not notifiable but that
may raise antitrust concerns, in lieu of filing under the Spin Act), and the
agencies can extend confidentiality to any substantive discussions by
officially commencing an investigation. For reasons flowing from
corporate law, no pre-spin filings are required of the subsidiary to be
spun. 258 That said, failure to comply with requested disclosures will result
in additional wait time or tolling of an existing wait period.
It is worth noting that the HSR Act treats control similarly to section
355, finding control when interest exceeds fifty percent – fifty percent
economic interest for noncorporate entities or a fifty percent ownership of
the voting securities in a corporate entity. 259 Similar treatment by tax and
antitrust regulatory review regimes is important to improving
administrability and managing expectations in the business community.

2. Post-spin Right of Action
The intention is for pre-spin review to create a practice like the process
that evolved under the HSR Act. That is, since Congress established premerger notification in 1976, most mergers are challenged prior to their
The waiting period for merger consummation under HSR is 30 days. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a.
257
The wait period provision should be long enough to afford government intervention
but not so long as to cause unnecessary delay, for example 60 days.
258
See supra Part I.
259
Compare 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b) (defining “control” of a corporation as owning 50
percent of the voting securities or having the right to appoint 50% of the directors, or in the
case of an unincorporated entity, control is having a 50% economic
interest) with I.R.C. § 355(a) (adopting the definition of “control” in Section 368(c) of the
Code, i.e., the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation).
256
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occurrence. 260 As a result, there is often no “post-acquisition” evidence to
consider. Nevertheless, the HSR Act condemns anticompetitive,
completed acquisitions, and empowers both the government and private
plaintiffs to pursue mergers that have already been consummated.
So too here. The Spin Act should create a post-spin right of action to
pursue separations that have already taken place. A post-spin right of
action may be of particular importance in the context of simultaneous and
serial spin-offs. If, for instance, a parent company spins off two or more
businesses in the same transaction, i.e., a simultaneous spin-off, a
competitive relationship must exist among SpinCo’s and between each
SpinCo and ParentCo. A post-spin right of action should be tailored to
detecting and prosecuting simultaneous spin-offs that do not result in
mutually competitive relationships. Likewise, a post-spin right of action
should enable regulatory agencies to investigate anticompetitive market
effects produced by consecutively ordered, i.e., serial, spin-offs. Serial
spin-offs potentiate anticompetitive harm when they are structured in ways
that avoid redistributing market power in the short-term and reserve
opportunities to reabsorb spun businesses in the long-term. 261
In discussing the utility of a post-spin right of action it becomes
obvious that in both cases – simultaneous spins and serial spins – a right
of action must be coupled with a “look-back” power to guard against over
enforcement. Because some spin-offs promote, or at least do not dampen,
competition, regulators should have the opportunity to look back at
consummated transactions. In other words, effective enforcement requires
guidelines designed to target only those consecutive spin-offs that are
anticompetitive. Much like the process the DOJ and FTC undertook to
develop Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 262
here, too, the DOJ and FTC should engage practitioners to develop agency
guidelines for spin-off transactions. In process and substance, the IP
Guidelines serve as an ideal model because they provide concrete
examples of competitive and anticompetitive licensing arrangements, and
harmonize antitrust and the legal right to exclude (the antithesis of nonrestraint) around a common goal of promoting innovation. 263 Here,
drafters might find a common goal around promoting shareholder value. 264
Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding & Antitrust
Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2044 (2018).
261
Cf. Kovacic, supra note 186, at 1310.
262
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTIRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (June 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IP
guidelines/download.
263
See GAVIL, ET AL., supra note 10, at 1176-81.
264
On this point, Professor Van Loo discusses how maximizing shareholder value
requires co-administration and reducing regulatory burden. See Van Loo, supra note 195,
260
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Coupling a post-spin right of action with an investigative power has
practical implications, too. Attorneys will have a better sense of how
enforcement agencies distinguish between competitive and
anticompetitive spin-offs when advising clients who wish to undertake
basic spin-offs as well as complex simultaneous or serial spin-offs. In the
words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “apart from the common law as
to the restraint of trade thus taken up by the statute, the law is full of
instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.” 265 Where the
consequences of being wrong implicate costly litigation and the possibility
of treble damages and imprisonment, clear standards and due investigation
serve the interests of all parties.
Building on the idea of guidelines, lawmakers should also consider
adopting a mandatory post-spin reporting period for transactions that are
“flagged” during pre-spin review and tied to limitations on ParentCo
liability. The process of flagging should be designed to incentivize former
parent companies to cure sources of anticompetitive conduct and alert the
progeny of the flagged spin-off to additional reporting requirements. For
example, if ParentCo liability for SpinCo antitrust violations extends as
long as its shareholders hold the majority of SpinCo voting shares,
additional reporting duties might require that, each year during the
reporting period, ParentCo and SpinCo must make certain filings with the
FTC and DOJ. These filings should require parent and progeny companies
to disclose of metrics related to market share, market power, on-going
relationships between the businesses, and on-going relationships the
businesses have with common third parties.
Before closing, additional research authorized by Section 6(b) of the
FTC Act bears mention. Under Section 6(b), the FTC may require a
company to file “reports or answers in writing to specific questions” about
its business practices. 266 Because little-to-no empirical study has been
done on the market effects of spin-offs like those hypothecated by this
Note, 6(b) Studies add obvious value. For example, some number of spun
companies retain very close ties with the parent, giving up little in terms
of business plan control in the intermediate term, even the long term. 267 In
such a case, the spin is a transparency or earnings-per-share play geared to
the stock market with some fine tuning of internal incentive arrangements.
at 1961. Antitrust guidelines for simultaneous and serial spin-offs might unlock
opportunities for co-administration by characterizing enforcement agencies as partners,
rather than adversaries, in the regulatory process. It is in all parties’ interests to facilitate
competitive spin-offs, stepping in only when clear anticompetitive harm arises.
265
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
266
15 U.S.C. § 46(b).
267
See generally WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra, note 64.
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Intuitively, these spins do little if anything to promote competition, which
is problematic only if the continuing ties exacerbate entry barriers or
effectively sequester market share. But whether intuition bears out in
practice, is once again, a question of degree and merits empirical study.

B.
offs

Legislative Grant of Power to Enjoin Anticompetitive Spin-

For the reasons discussed in relation to the Copperweld decision,
current doctrine relegates antitrust plaintiffs to the sidelines until the spinoff transaction is complete, and once complete, exists on an exclusively
go-forward basis. There is a need to create an earlier point of intervention.
Some of the machinery proposed under the Spin Act above addresses this
problem. 268 Under the Spin Act, enforcement agencies may intervene
insofar as ParentCo follows the proposed guidelines and collaborates with
the enforcement agency. Additional enforcement power is needed in the
event the administrative mechanisms fail.
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act “is prospective, not retrospective,” and
authorizes suit only when a defendant “is violating or is about to violate”
the antitrust laws. 269 Even assuming an antitrust plaintiff can use evidence
of pre-spin conduct, 270 the claim faces the significant uphill battle of
getting around the defense that such threats are purely speculative. That
said, if a corporation is actively engaged or about to be engaged in antitrust
litigation, that fact should create a basis for enjoining a spin-off
transaction. Similarly, blatantly anticompetitive conduct during pre-spin
negotiations, such as discriminatory clauses in spin-off agreements, should
be vulnerable to temporary, if not permanent, injunction. A legislative
grant of power should give enforcement agencies the power to preempt
anticompetitive and suspected anticompetitive spin-off transactions.

CONCLUSION
There is a reason why large agglomerative corporations, like
Alphabet, Amazon, or Meta, would voluntarily break off valuable parts of
their businesses—and it isn’t to be helpful. Even if control is surrendered
on paper, control is maintained by common owners. Setting aside the sheer

See supra Part IV, at Section A, Subsection 1.
AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1348 (2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
270
Because Copperweld specifically declared a parent could not collude with a
subsidiary, 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984), a suit sought for a violation alleged to occur pre-spin
is out of the question.
268
269
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economic advantage, 271 spin-offs offer a degree of power and control
court-ordered separations do not. The pressures created by the corporate
tax code are geared toward preventing transactions like that which was
undertaken by Kerr-McGee in In re Tronox, which are designed to prevent
a corporation from sequestering its assets by spinning-off its debt. 272 Nor
should a corporation be able to avoid taxes by cloaking a sale in spin-off
garb. But short of spinning-off a device or freeing-up assets it later plans
to sell, corporations are practically unrestrained from deciding what goes,
what stays, and what the SpinCo can and cannot do.
To be sure, a corporation may elect to spin-off a wholly owned
subsidiary for valid management and business purposes. Not all spin-offs
raise competitive concerns. In fact, section 355 spin-offs frequently have
pro-competitive effects and are still an important alternative for antitrust
regulators. 273 But sanctification under the federal tax code proves no more
of post-spin coordination than corporate law statutes proved of
impermissible restraints of trade. 274 That spin-offs are not inherently
anticompetitive should not shield aberrant uses from antitrust scrutiny. If
anything, the potential for anticompetitive spin-offs to erode the goals of
the Corporate Tax Code urges legislative intervention and judicial review.
The goal should be co-administration. 275 Time is of the essence.

See Owers & Sergi, supra note 84, at 7; see also Boudreaux, supra note 85, at 623
(finding significantly better returns when divestiture was voluntary than court-ordered
under the Clayton Act).
272
Cf. In re Tronox Inc., 429 B.R. 73, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
273
In 2015, eBay made headlines by announcing its plan to spin-off PayPal, the digital
payment company it acquired in 2002. eBay’s decision to spin-off PayPal was justified in
part by eBay’s plans to develop its own digital payment system. See EBAY, supra note 236.
And indeed, three years later, eBay was managing the end-to-end payments process on its
platform in the United States. See eBay Begins Intermediating Payments on its Marketplace
Platform in the US, EBAY: PRESS ROOM (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/
news/ebay-begins-intermediating-payments-on-its-marketplace-platform-in-the-us/. By
the end of 2020, eBay expanded its payment system to more than one million sellers
worldwide. eBay Begins Managing Payments in France, Italy and Spain, EBAY: PRESS
ROOM (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/ebay-begins-managingpayments-in-france-italy-and-spain/. Accordingly, the eBay case evidences the potential of
spin-offs to drive innovation and promote competition.
274
See Nicholas Walter, Antitrust and Corporate Law: Revisiting the Market for
Corporate Control, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 755, 770-72, 775 (2013).
275
See Van Loo, supra note 195, at 1961.
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APPENDIX
I. Structures of Three Primary Types of Section 355
Transactions 276

Figure. The focus of the Note is a simple “Spin-off” (far left).
ParentCo (“Distributing,” in figure), relinquishes control of SpinCo
(“Controlled,” in figure), and distributes stock in SpinCo (“C Stock”) to
ParentCo shareholders. The end result is that shareholders of ParentCo
stock retain their pre-spin holdings in ParentCo and newly own stock in
SpinCo. That is, ParentCo shareholders receive a pro rata distribution of
SpinCo stock. In this sense, a spin-off is similar to a corporate dividend.
A Split-off (center) is identical to a spin-off except that some
shareholders of ParentCo surrender a portion of their ParentCo stock in
exchange for stock in SpinCo, while a different group of shareholders
continue to hold stock in ParentCo. There is no requirement of a pro rata
redemption in a split-off transaction. And finally, in a Split-up (far right),
ParentCo distributes the stock of two or more of its subsidiaries to its
shareholders as a part of a plan of complete liquidation. The resultant
Illustration excerpted from Bodoh et al., Spin-offs in the Current Uncertain
Environment, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, 1, 6 (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.weil.com
/~/media/mailings/2021/q1/part-i--spinoffs-in-the-current-uncertain-environment.pdf.
276
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SpinCo’s may be pre-existing or newly created. In the case of two
SpinCo’s, some prior shareholders of ParentCo hold stock in SpinCo1
(“C1”) and a different group of prior shareholders hold stock in SpinCo2
(“C2”). At the end of the transaction, ParentCo ceases to exist.
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Amazon / AWS Spin-off
A. Financials 277

The chart is excerpted from Nathan Reiff’s article, How Amazon Makes Money
Product Sales, Advertising, Subscription Services, and Cloud Services, and was prepared
by Matthew Johnston. INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 19, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/howamazon-makes-money-4587523.
277
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B. Amazon/AWS Spin-off: Ownership and Infrastructure 278

Jeff Bezos controls the majority (12.7%) of the voting stock. Postspin, Mr. Bezos controls the majority of the voting stock of Amazon (stock
symbol, “AMZN”) and AWS.
b
Post-spin shareholders hold shares in AMZN (87.3%) and AWS
(87.3%). The figure refers to AWS holders by their pre-spin holdings, i.e.,
AMZN shares, to illustrate the post-spin beneficial owners of AWS are the
same people and entities who own Amazon and in the same proportions of
their holding of AMZN stock.
a

Data from Amazon.com, Inc., Notice of 2022 Annual Meeting of Shareholders &
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 87 (Apr. 14, 2022).
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